California Mediation and Arbitration

Pending Cases: Viking Cruises Is No Longer "Pending" And 9th Circuit Withdraws Opinion Re AB 51 And Mandatory Arbitration

Catching Up From Last Week . . .

Viking Cruises v. Moriana, PAGA, And Federal Preemption. 

        We posted on June 19, 2022 about the Viking Cruises case, in which SCOTUS ruled individual PAGA claims can be arbitrated. In a concurrence, Justice Sotomayor wrote, "As a whole, the Court’s opinion makes clear that California is not powerless to address its sovereign concern that it cannot adequately enforce its Labor Code without assistance from private attorneys general." She so much as invited the California Supreme Court and the Legislature to address the interpretation of state law, and to clarify the issue of standing to bring representative claims. SCOTUS denied a request for rehearing of Viking Cruises on August 22, 2022. See the August 24, 2022 post by attorneys Mia Farber and Scott P. Lang.

Chamber of Commerce v. Bonta. California, ABA 51, And Federal Preemption.

        We posted on September 19, 2021 about Chamber of Commerce v. Bonta, the 9th Circuit case holding the Federal Arbitration Act does not preempt AB 51, the California legislation forbidding employers from requiring agreement to mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment. The majority opinion drew a dissent from Judge Ikuta.

        As we wrote in our post at the time, "The Ninth Circuit has probably set up a conflict between federal circuits in Chamber of Commerce v. Bonta, and with Judge Ikuta's dissent, there is a reasonable probability that the majority opinion will not be the last word on the subject." That turns out to have been an understatement, as the 9th Circuit took the unusual step of withdrawing the opinion and granting a panel rehearing. See August 23, 2022 post by attorneys Mia Farber, Scott P. Lang, and Cecilie E. Read.

Ninth Circuit Holds Jurisdiction Exists To Enforce Arbitral Document Subpoena In California For International Arbitration Pending In DC

Fighting About Obtaining Discovery In International Arbitration Pending In US . . . 

 

        A problem occasionally encountered in arbitration is getting a court to enforce a document subpoena issued by the arbitrator. That was the problem in Jones Day v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, Michael D. Torpey, Mitchell Zuklie, 21-16642 (9th Cir.  8/1/22) (Wardlaw, Ikuta, Bade).  

        The situation here was that Jones Day sought discovery from Orrick in an arbitration involving a partnership dispute and an attorney who was a German national, the arbitration was in Washington DC, and Orrick is headquartered in San Francisco. The problem that required a solution was finding subject matter jurisdiction in federal court and a means to enforce a subpoena in California.

        The eventual solution, after some misfires, was to get the arbitrator to agree to sit for a hearing in California, have the arbitrator issue a by now "revised" subpoena, and file an action in the USDC, Northern District of California, to enforce the subpoena. While this solution eventually worked, it did not work in the USDC, Northern District, because the judge construed the Federal Arbitration Act to only allow the arbitrator to issue a subpoena where the arbitrator was sitting, i.e., DC. Jones Day then petitioned the Ninth Circuit -- successfully -- in order to enforce the arbitral summonses.

        Judge Wardlaw explains, "[W]e must decide whether an action to enforce an arbitral summons issued by the arbitrator in an ongoing international arbitration under the [New York] Convention also “falls under the Convention.” We join our sister circuits in holding that (1) if the underlying arbitration agreement or award falls under the Convention, and (2) the action or proceeding relates to that agreement or award, then the federal district court has jurisdiction over the action or  proceeding." Here, there was subject matter jurisdiction, because the international arbitration fell under the Convention, and the proceeding to issue summonses for the subpoenas related to the agreement.

        One question remained: where could the subpoenas be enforced? An arbitral subpoena can be enforced by the district court sitting in the district where the arbitration is located pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 204, but the court in Washington DC lacked personal jurisdiction over Orrick in San Francisco. Solution: "[W]here, as here, that federal district court lacks personal jurisdiction over the party against whom enforcement is sought, we hold that the action may be brought in any district court deemed appropriate under the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because [9 U.S.C.] § 204 supplements, rather than supplants, other venue rules."

        COMMENT: While Orrick may be displeased with the outcome of this discovery skirmish, the ruling will be welcomed by litigators who seek documents in international arbitration and are sometimes stymied by jurisdictional rules.

 

Consumers, Employment, FAA: Second Dist. Div. 1 Holds CA Statutes Protecting Employee From "Procedural Limbo" In Arbitration Are Not Preempted By Federal Law

Business That Dilly-Dally About Paying Arbitration Fees Face Consequences.

        In a case of first impression, the California Court of Appeal asks whether California Code of Civil Procedure, §§ 1281.97, 1281.98, and 1281.99 are preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Sunny Gallo v. Wood Ranch, USA, B311067 (2/1  7/25/22) (Hoffstadt, Ashmann-Gerst, Chavez). Those statutory provisions were enacted in California to protect employees and consumers from falling into a state of "procedural limbo" when a business that has drafted an arbitration agreement fails to pay arbitration fees within 30 days after the fees are due. This failure to pay fees can lead to delay and "procedural limbo" in an arbitration. The consequences are significant under the recent California statutes because the "drafter" can end up paying all the fees, or lose the right to arbitrate, or even face sanctions such as termination, evidence preclusion, monetary payment, and even contempt.

        The court holds that the California statutes are not preempted, "because the procedures they prescribe further—rather than frustrate—the objectives of the FAA to honor the parties’ intent to arbitrate and to preserve arbitration as a speedy and effective alternative forum for resolving disputes." 

        COMMENT: Businesses with arbitration provisions should not dilly-dally about paying their share of arbitration fees in employment and consumer disputes, given the severe consequences. Consumers and employees should also be alert to whether fees are timely paid, as the failure by the "drafter" to make timely payment creates options for the consumer or employee.

Arbitration, FAA: Federal Arbitration Act Applied To Intrastate Driver Who Worked For Paratransit Service For Persons With Disabilities

Federal Preemption Of California's Gentry Rule Means Class Action Waiver Can Be Enforced.

        David Evenskaas, a driver, filed a wage and hour lawsuit against his employer, California Transit, Inc., which operates paratransit services for persons with disabilities in West and Central Los Angeles.  Evenskaas's employment agreement included a broad arbitration agreement with a class action waiver that the employer tried, unsuccessfully, to enforce in the trial court. The employer appealed. Evenskaas v. California Transit, Inc., B308354 (2/7  7/15/22) (Segal, Perluss, Feuer). 

        The issue was whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempted California law and the rule in Gentry v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 443 (2007), which holds that certain class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements are unenforceable. The trial court had determined that interstate commerce was not involved, because California Transit, Inc. operated in California, and absent involvement in interstate commerce, there could be no federal preemption by the FAA.

        However, the Court of Appeal reached a different result, distinguishing those cases holding intrastate activities not affecting interstate commerce do not trigger federal preemption. "None of them involved an arbitration agreement between an employer and an employee hired to provide commercial services required by federal law enacted by Congress under its commerce power. Moreover, in Carbajal, Lane, and Woolls the party arguing the FAA applied did not present evidence of the party’s business that would show a connection to interstate commerce." The ADA is enacted with Congress exercising its commerce powers to the fullest, and transportation through a paratransit service affects the ability of persons with disabilities to participate in the national economy.

        COMMENT: If the driver, like a trucker, fell within a class of workers who was actually engaged in interstate commerce, then he would specifically be excluded from coverage under the FAA. 9 USC § 1.

 

 

 

 

Arbitration, FAA, Transportation Workers: SCOTUS Holds FAA Transportation Worker Exemption Applies To Airline Workers Who Load Cargo

The FAA Exempts Interstate-Transportation Workers And Others Like Them From Arbitration.

        On June 6, 2022, in an 8-0 opinion authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, SCOTUS held that Latrice Saxon, a ramp supervisor for Southwest Airlines, was exempted by the Federal Arbitration Act from having to arbitrate. Southwest Airlines v. Saxon, No. 21-309 (S. Ct. 6/6/22). A catchall-phrase in the FAA, exempting from arbitration "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” covered Saxon. 

        COMMENT: Saxon brought a putative class action for wage and hour violations. How helpful the ruling will be for class actions involving workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce is uncertain, because SCOTUS did not accept Saxon's argument that the exemption applied broadly to all airline workers. At the same time, SCOTUS did not accept Southwest Airlines' argument that the exemption applied  narrowly to workers who actually transported goods across state lines. In future cases, the courts will have to look closely at the specific facts to determine the scope of the exemption. 

Arbitration, Waiver: US Supreme Court Holds Prejudice Is Not Required To Find Waiver Of Right To Arbitrate

Arbitration Agreements Must Be Placed On Equal Footing With Other Contracts -- So Courts Can't Make Up Special Procedural Rules That Apply Only To Arbitration.

        In a unanimous opinion penned by Justice Elena Kagan, the Supreme Court holds that courts cannot create arbitration-specific federal procedural rules, such as the rule that prejudice is necessary to find a waiver of the right to arbitrate, based on the Federal Arbitration Act policy favoring arbitration. Morgan v. Sundance, No. 31-328 (US S.Ct. 5/23/22).

        Petitioner Morgan, an employee, sued respondent Sundance, which owned the Taco Bell franchise where Morgan worked, alleging Sundance fudged time-keeping records so as to avoid paying overtime to employees. Her contract with her employer included a mandatory arbitration agreement. Sundance filed a motion to dismiss, answered, and mediated, before deciding after eight months to arbitrate. The District Court, finding prejudice to Morgan by the conduct of Sundance, and waiver of the right to arbitrate, denied the motion to arbitrate. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, finding no prejudice, and thus no waiver of the right to arbitrate.

        A common definition of waiver is that it involves the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Applying that definition, a party that knows of its right to arbitrate and acts inconsistently with that right, can be found to have waived the right to arbitrate. But many courts have added the additional element of prejudice before they will find waiver of the right to arbitrate. Applying a definition of waiver that includes the element of prejudice has enabled defendants to test the waters in litigation, and then decide later to arbitrate, arguing that there has been no prejudice to plaintiff.

        The Morgan v. Sundance case is interesting because it requires consideration of two conflicting policies: The FAA favors arbitration, and the FAA also requires that arbitration agreements be treated on equal footing with other contracts. Here, the two policies came into conflict. In Morgan v. Sundance, the "equal footing" argument wins out. Arbitration does not get special treatment -- in this case, special treatment that would have favored the employer. Thus, in evaluating whether there has been a waiver, it is improper to add an additional element, prejudice, that would not typically be found in other instances where courts ask whether there has been an intentional relinquishment of a known right.

        How this case will be handled on remand is somewhat muddied: "The parties have also quarreled about whether to understand that inquiry as involving rules of waiver, forfeiture, estoppel, laches, or procedural timeliness. We do not address those issues." So on remand, the court could choose a different procedural framework. But the waiver framework seems like it would offer a pretty clean approach: the respondent knew of its right to arbitrate, chose to litigate, inconsistent with its right to arbitrate, and thus intentionally relinquished a known right.

        COMMENT: Several years ago, my colleague Mike Hensley and I had a case before the Ninth Circuit, in which we argued that our defendant client, a cosmetology school, had not waived its right to arbitrate because the plaintiff had not been prejudiced by our client's conduct. The Ninth Circuit panel disagreed with our position and found a waiver had occurred. Martin v. Yasuda, 829 F.3d 1118 (2016). Later, in the district court once again, our client's motion for summary judgment on the underlying merits was granted. Procedural battles over the right to arbitrate are important, but do not necessarily govern the outcome.

 

 

 

 

Arbitration, Delegation, Choice Of Law: Sixth District Affirms Denial Of Motion To Compel Arbitration Because There Was No Agreement To Arbitrate

Whether An Arbitration Agreement Exists Was A Gateway Issue For The Court To Decide.

        Agreeing with the trial court that there was no agreement express or implied to arbitrate, the Court of Appeal affirms the trial court's order denying employer's motion to compel arbitration in a putative class action wage and hours case brought by a trucker. Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport et al., H044372 (6th Dist.  3/1/22) (Greenwood, Elia, Grover). This is a 55-page opinion and I will be brief.

        First, the opinion addressed choice of law: did the California Arbitration Act or the Federal Arbitration Act apply? Answer: the CAA applied, because of the carve-out in the FAA for "workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce," meaning transportation workers. And Mr. Mendoza fell into the carve-out category because he was a trucker. Therefore, the CAA applied.

        Second, the Court of Appeal refused to enforce a delegation clause delegating the issue of contract formation to an arbitrator. It found the issue to have been forfeited because it was only raised in reply papers. Nevertheless, addressing the merits, the Court concluded that not all gateway issues are delegable, and the issue of whether an agreement to arbitrate existed was one for the courts to decide.

        Third, the Court agreed that the parties had not agreed to arbitrate. The problem was that, while the employee acknowledged receipt of a handbook and 14 other items, and acknowledged that any questions he had were answered, nothing in the mass of documents pointed him to an arbitration clause, and there was no signature line for the arbitration policy that could have been found in the handbook.  Nor would the Court conclude that there was an "implied in fact" contract, simply because the employee received the handbook and continued to work for the company, because nothing drew the employee's attention to the arbitration policy. 

        COMMENT: Employers who want to make an arbitration agreement "stick" should include signature lines, and make it clear and unmistakable in writing to the employee that the employee is agreeing to arbitrate. We note that Mendoza was Spanish speaking and did not read or write English. The employer's director of human resources testified that his custom and  practice was to explain the written material to employees and that a Spanish translation was provided, which, however, Mendoza did not recall. For employees who may not be fluent in English, it is preferable to have clear and unmistakable evidence that they have received a written translation.

Employment, Legislation, FAA Preemption: Can California Protect Employees From Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements And Avoid Federal Preemption?

Paul Dubow And Marc Alexander Have Published An Article About FAA Preemption And California's AB 51.

        The article, entitled Can California Protect Employees From Entering Into Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements?, appears in California Litigation, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2021). Paul Dubow is a seasoned mediator and arbitrator in the Bay Area, and Marc Alexander is your blogger.

        The article is republished here, with the permission of the California Lawyers Association and California Litigation, the journal of the Litigation Section of the CLA.

Pending Case, PAGA, FAA: Viking Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana Is A Case To Watch

The United States Supreme Court Granted Cert On December 15, 2022.

        The issue: "Whether the Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement providing that an employee cannot raise representative claims, including under the California Private Attorneys General Act."

        Readers of this blog will know that California courts have repeatedly ruled, following Iskanian, that employees cannot be forced to arbitrate PAGA representative claims. The basic reason underlying this conclusion is that PAGA representative claims are in the nature of qui tam actions, and therefore the interest of the state of California is involved. But since the state is not a party to the employee's arbitration agreement, arbitration of representative claims cannot be compelled. The issue before the United States Supreme Court is whether this "carve-out" of mandatory arbitration is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.

        COMMENT: I have been publishing this blog since 2012, and I don't think I have ever before predicted the outcome of a case. This time, I'm going to stick my neck out and predict that the Supreme Court's decision, given the current composition of the court and its decision to take the case, will not go well for the employee. We shall see. If my prediction proves to be accurate, I will let you know. And if I'm wrong . . . well, we'll see.

Arbitration, FAA, Transportation: 9th Circuit Agrees Domino's Drivers Transporting Pizza Ingredients To Franchisees Intrastate Are Engaged In Interstate Commerce

Engaged In Interstate Commerce, Domino's Drivers Delivering Pizza Ingredients Intrastate Are Exempt From Requirements of Federal Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C § 1.

 

 

How Domino's Makes Its Pizza ↑

Downtown LA Pizza. Carol Highsmith, photographer. 2012. Library of Congress. ↑

Jon Stewart Deep Dish Pizza Rant. ↓

 

                                                                                 

        In an opinion penned by Judge Hurwitz, the 9th Circuit affirmed a  district court  decision denying Domino 's motion to compel arbitration in a labor law lawsuit brought by drivers who delivered pizza ingredients from a central distribution center to Domino's franchisees. Carmona v. Domino's Pizza, No. 21-55009 (9th Cir.  12/23/21) (Hurwitz, McLane, Parker).     

        The Federal Arbitration Act exempts transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce from the requirements of the FAA. The drivers working for  Domino's work in-state, but when they deliver pizza ingredients to Domino's franchisees, they are acting as  workers engaged in a “single, unbroken stream of interstate commerce” that renders interstate commerce a “central part” of their job description. Judge Hurwitz relied on a similar 9th Circuit case involving Amazon delivery drivers, Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2020). See our earlier 8/31/20 post on Rittmann. 

        Judge Hurwitz writes that there are distinctions between the Amazon and Domino's Pizza cases: "The customers to whom the Amazon drivers delivered the interstate goods in Rittmann initiated the purchases online with Amazon . . .  while the Domino’s franchisees order the goods from the Supply Center in California only after Domino’s has already purchased them. But this is a distinction without a difference." In the end, the drivers are still participating in a single, unbroken stream of interstate commerce.