California Mediation and Arbitration

Second District CCA Reverses Two Trial Court Rulings That Had Denied Requests To Arbitrate

Stephnie Trujillo v. J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc.,  B327111 (2/8  12/2/24) (Stratton, Grimes, Wiley).

        This case involves an employer's obligation to make timely payment to the arbitrator, as required by statute, or face the prospect of losing the right to arbitrate. The facts are unusual.

        Stephnie Trujillo filed a complaint against her former employer, J-M Manufacturing Company (JMM), and four coworkers alleging sexual/gender discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and other claims. The parties entered into a post-dispute arbitration stipulation, which was court-approved. JMM made timely payments to the arbitrator for over a year but failed to pay an invoice within the required 30-day grace period under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. Despite promptly paying the overdue amount upon notice, Trujillo sought to withdraw from arbitration, citing JMM’s late payment as a material breach under section 1281.98.

        The trial court granted Trujillo’s motion to withdraw. On appeal, JMM argued section 1281.98 did not apply because the arbitration was based on a post-dispute stipulation, not a pre-dispute agreement, and JMM was not the “drafting party” as defined in the statute.

        The Court of Appeal agreed with JMM, holding section 1281.98 applies exclusively to pre-dispute arbitration agreements where the employer or business is the drafting party. Since the arbitration arose from a negotiated post-dispute stipulation primarily drafted by Trujillo, the statute was inapplicable. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and directed reinstatement of arbitration proceedings.

Edgar Gonzalez v. Nowhere Beverly Hills LLC et al., B328959 (2/1  12/3/24) (Kline, Rothschild, Bendix).

        In this case, an employee finds himself required by equitable estoppel to arbitrate.

        Edgar Gonzalez, a former employee of Nowhere Santa Monica (one of the 10 Nowhere entities operating Erewhon markets in Los Angeles), filed a lawsuit alleging violations of California labor laws, including unpaid wages and failure to provide required breaks. Gonzalez signed an employment agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica that included an arbitration clause. However, his claims were against all 10 Nowhere entities, which he alleged were joint employers.

        The trial court compelled arbitration against Nowhere Santa Monica but denied the motion for the other entities, ruling there was no evidence to show equitable estoppel applied. Gonzalez later dismissed his claims against Nowhere Santa Monica.

        On appeal, the court reversed the trial court's decision, holding that Gonzalez’s claims against the non-Santa Monica entities were so intertwined with his employment agreement that he could not avoid arbitration. The appellate court found Gonzalez equitably estopped from denying arbitration with the non-signatory entities because his joint-employer theory relied on shared obligations stemming from the employment agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica.

        BONUS. Nowhere Beverly Hills LLC operates the Erewhon organic products markets in Los Angeles. Erewhon is an anadrome derived from nowhere -- it is nowhere spelled backswards (almost, since the wh did not get reversed). Erewhon: Or, Over the Range, is also the title of Samuel Butler's 1872 novel about a satirical utopia.

 

Nonsignatories: Employer Could Not Take Advantage Of Arbitration Agreement In A Temporary Staffing Agency's Contract

Equitable Estoppel, Third-Party Beneficiary, And Agency Arguments Of Employer Failed To Gain Traction.

        Nelida Soltero sued her employer, which sought to compel arbitration, based on an arbitration agreement in a contract between Soltero and Real Time Staffing Services, a temporary worker staffing agency. However, the employer was not a signatory to the agreement between Soltero and Real Time Staffing Services. The trial judge denied the employer's motion to compel arbitration, the employer appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. Soltero v. Precise Distribution, Inc., D083308 (4/1  6/18/24) (Buchanan, Do, Irion).

        COMMENT: We have posted before about cases in which employers have relied on an arbitration clause in a temporary staffing agency company on 7/18/16, 4/26/17, 5/17/17. In fact, the two posts in 2017 relate to Garcia v. Pexco, 11 Cal.App.5th 782 (2017), a case that also involved the staffing agency Real Time. But that case had a different result than Soltero: the employer Garcia was required to arbitrate.

        Cases such as Soltero and Garcia, in which the nonsignatory seeks to take advantage of a third-party's arbitration provision, rely on theories of equitable estoppel, third-party beneficiary, or agency. The Soltero court does not follow Garcia's theory of equitable estoppel, explaining that Soltero's claims did not rely on her contract with the staffing agency. Nor was the employer an intended third-party beneficiary of the staffing agency contract. Finally, while Garcia had sued his employer Pexco, alleging that it and the staffing agency were "joint employees", Soltero did not allege joint employment or agency.

Automobiles, Nonsignatories: Fourth Dist. Div. 2 Rejects Equitable Estoppel Doctrine Of Felisilda

One More California Appellate Case Rejects Felisilda.

        We have written before about courts rejecting the application of the equitable estoppel doctrine to allow vehicle manufacturers to piggyback on to the arbitration provision in sales contracts between customers and automobile dealerships. In Davis v. Nissan North America, Inc. v. Nissan North America, Inc., D083006 (4/1  3/15/24) (Buchanan, Do; Irion dsst) an automobile manufacturer and an authorized vehicle repair facility tried to take advantage of the arbitration agreement in the dealership contract, even though the manufacturer and the repair facility were not signatories to the arbitration agreement. Once more, the Court of Appeal rejected the equitable estoppel doctrine of Felisilda that would have allowed nonsignatories to rely on the arbitration agreement.

        Justice Irion dissented, relying on the equitable estoppel doctrine.

Automobiles, Nonsignatories: Hyundai Is Unable To Piggback Onto Dealership's Arbitration Agreement

California Court of Appeal, 3rd District, Disagrees With California Court of Appeal, 3rd District.

        A Third District California Court of Appeal panel composed of Justices Renner, Earl, and Hull, disagrees with an earlier Third District panel composed of Justices Hoch, Robie, and Murray. The issue is whether an automobile manufacturer can rely on an arbitration agreement between a dealership and a customer to compel the customer to arbitrate a breach of warranty claim with the nonsignatory automobile manufacturer. The earlier case, Dina C. Felisilda et al., v. FCA US LLC, 53 Cal.App.5th 486 (2020), held that the manufacturer could rely, because the customer had to rely on the contract with the dealer to sue the manufacturer. We posted about the Felisilda case on 8/29/20.

        In light of developing case law, Justice Renner, writing for the court, disagrees with Felisilda. The customer's claim that the manufacturer breached its warranty does not rely on the customer's contract with the dealership. The manufacturer's warranty is not part of the dealership contract. Mark Kielar v. Superior Ct. of Placer County (Hyundai Motor America, Real Party in Interest), C096773 (3rd Dist. 8/16/23).

Scope, Equitable Estoppel: 9th Circuit Holds Discrimination Claims Were Outside Scope Of Arbitration, And Equitable Estoppel Prevented Bank From Arguing Borrower Couldn't Opt Out

There Were Two Agreements To Arbitrate And Neither Worked.

        Iliana Perez entered into two arbitration agreements: one, with Citibank in 2010 in connection with a student loan, the second, with Discover Bank in 2018, in connection with a consolidation loan for her student loan. She sued Discover Bank after her application for a consolidation loan was denied in, based on her undocumented immigration status. Discover Bank moved unsuccessfully in the trial court to compel arbitration under the two arbitration agreements, a result that was affirmed on appeal. Perez v. Discover Bank, 22-15322 (9th Cir.  7/24/23) (S.R. Thomas, Holly Thomas, Rakoff).

        The dispute centered around the denial of the consolidation loan, which occurred some eight years after Perez entered into the arbitration agreement relating to the student loan. The consolidation loan was not within the scope of the earlier agreement.

        As for the second agreement, Perez argued that it was unconscionable. However, in court, Discover Bank's attorney argued that it could not be unconscionable, because Perez still had 30 days to opt out. After the hearing, Perez did opt out of arbitration under the second agreement. After Perez opted out, the court addressed the matter again. Now Discover Bank's attorney argued that Perez's exercise of her opt out only applied to future discrimination, not past discrimination. But that position was inconsistent with the earlier representation to the court, and the Ninth Circuit invoked the doctrine of equitable estoppel to reject Discover Bank's argument that Perez could not opt out of arbitration for past discrimination. Indeed, Discover Bank's argument that the second agreement was not unconscionable relied, at least in part, on its representation to the court that Perez could still opt out. So it would have been unfair not to hold the bank to a representation upon which the court had earlier relied.

Nonsignatories: Second Dist., Div. 7 Holds Ford Motor Company Cannot Compel Arbitration Under Dealership Contract

Second District, Div. 7 Sides With Second Dist., Div. 8, Rejects Reasoning In Third District Case.

        Rejecting equitable estoppel and third-party beneficiary theories, the Court of Appeal holds that Ford Motor Company cannot piggyback on to the arbitration provision in a dealership contract, and thus Ford is unable to compel arbitration with the buyer of its vehicle. The plaintiff's claim for breach of express warranty against Ford was not based on or intertwined with the dealership's contract with the buyer. In fact, the dealership contract provided it offered no express manufacturer's warranties, though the manufacturer, Ford, could do so. Rosanna Montemayor et al. v. Ford Motor Company, B20477 (2/7  6/26/23) (Feuer, Perluss, Escalante).

        The opinion is in line with the reasoning in the Ford Motor Warranty Cases, 89 Cal.App.5th 1324 (2023) [see my 5/3/23 post] and at odds with the reasoning in Felisilda v. FCA US LLC , 53 Cal.App.5th 486 (2020) [see my 8/29/2020 post]. 

Non-Signatories' Efforts To Compel Arbitration Based On Equitable Estoppel, Agency, and Third-Party Bene Theories All Failed

The Trial Judge Said He Had An Issue Of First Impression.

        Jessica Hernandez sued Meridian Management Services, LLC and other entities for employment violations. The defendants sought to piggyback on to an arbitration agreement that Ms. Hernandez had entered into with her employer Intelex in order to compel her to arbitrate. Her lawyer, however, was careful with the pleadings, for Hernandez apparently did not name Intelex as a party, nor did she claim that Intelex and her other employers, the defendants (Other Firms) were joint employers. The trial judge denied the motion of the Other Firms to compel arbitration based on a contract with an arbitration agreement they had not signed. And the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was right. Hernandez v. Meridian Management Services, LLC, B312814 (2/8  1/30/23) (Wiley, Stratton, Grimes).

        It was not as if there was no relationship between Intelex and the Other Firms. After all, Ms. Hernandez worked for both. Moreover, though the Other Firms were separate legal entities from Intelex, they were "functionally related." Hernandez "alleged the Other Firms shared the same legal and physical address; the same human resources person; the same controller; the same payroll department; the same risk management and legal services; and the same centralized information technology." But whatever the functional relationships, they were not enough for defendants to compel arbitration based on theories of equitable estoppel, agency, or third party beneficiary.

        Equitable estoppel. This is the issue that led the trial judge to state he had an issue of first impression on his hands: “[t]ypically the doctrine of equitable estoppel is applied where a signatory has sued both another signatory and certain non-signatories on identical claims. . . . [¶] But what happens if the other party to the contract is not also a party to the case, and never was?" Intelex, the party with the arbitration agreement in its contract, was not a party to the case, yet it was the Intelex agreement that the Other Firms wished to take advantage of. In any case, the Court of Appeal concluded that equitable estoppel could not apply because there was no evidence Hernandez was trying to take advantage of anything she had done wrong.

        Agency. The Other Firms offered no evidence that they were empowered to act on behalf of Intelex.

        Third-party beneficiary. There was no evidence that it was a motivating purpose of Intelex and Hernandez to provide a benefit for a third party.

        Affirmed.

 

Arbitration, Equitable Estoppel: Non-Signatory Plaintiffs Are Not Required By Equitable Estoppel To Arbitrate

First District Division 1 Explains What Will And What Will Not Result In Equitable Estoppel Requiring Non-Signatory To Arbitrate.

        After plaintiffs in coordinated cases hired the Fertility Center (Pacific) to provide fertility-related services, a tank used by Pacific to freeze eggs failed. The tank was manufactured by Chart, Inc., (Chart), and sold to Pacific by Praxair, which also helped with installation. Plaintiffs' contract with Pacific included an arbitration provision, and thus plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate claims with Pacific. Naturally, defendants Chart and Praxair tried to piggyback onto Pacific's arbitration agreement. Though Chart and Praxair were non-signatories to the arbitration agreement, they argued that plaintiffs were equitably estopped from refusing to arbitrate. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeal rejected Chart's and Praxair's effort to compel arbitration. Pacific Fertility Cases, A158155 (1/1  pub. 12/1/22) (Banke, Margulies, Devine).

        Chart and Praxair argued that but for plaintiffs' contract with Pacific, their claim against Chart and Praxair would never have arisen. The case is helpful because it explains that this "but-for test" is insufficient to establish equitable estoppel. In explaining why the "but-for test" was insufficient, Justice Banke distinguished the situation from that in a case in which consumers had sued Apple and AT&T for allegedly conniving to get consumers to subscribe to a network and buy an Apple phone that could not be used properly with the network. In the case involving Apple, the court had found that the consumers were equitably estopped from refusing to arbitrate. 

        Here, however, the situation was different: "[A]s the court correctly stated, the analysis is not a simple 'but for' test, but whether plaintiffs’ claims demonstrate ' "actual reliance on the terms of the [Pacific] agreement[s] to impose liability." '  Plaintiffs’ claims against Chart and Praxair do not rely on the terms of their agreements with Pacific.  Nor do plaintiffs allege concerted action or an ongoing relationship among Pacific, Praxair, and Chart.  Thus, the circumstances here are distinguishable from those in Appel II."

Arbitration, Nonsignatories, Equitable Estoppel: Ninth Circuit Holds Nonsignatory BMW Could Not Enforce Dealer's Arbitration Agreement With Customer

Nonsignatories Can Sometimes Enforce An Arbitration Agreement Based On A Third-Party Beneficiary Or  Equitable Estoppel Theory - But Such Was Not The Case Here.

         After Kim Ngo purchased a BMW that Ngo alleged was a lemon, BMW sought to enforce an arbitration agreement between the Dealer and Ngo, to which BMW was not a signatory. The trial court agreed that BMW was a third-party beneficiary that could enforce the agreement. The Ninth Circuit reversed.  A significant fact is that Ngo sued BMW for breach of warranty, but did not sue the Dealer under the agreement containing the arbitration provision. Ngo v. BMW of North America, No. 20-56027 (9th Cir.  1/13/22) (Parker, sitting by desig., Wardlaw, Hurwitz).

        For the three-part third-party beneficiary test applied by Judge Parker, which the panel concluded BMW failed, see Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC, 6 Cal. 5th 817 (2019) (third-party must benefit from contract; contracting parties must have "motivating purpose" to benefit third-party; enforcement must be consistent with "reasonable expectations" of the contracting parties and contract objectives).

        As to "equitable estoppel", (a) there was not concerted misconduct between BMW and the Dealer; (b) Ngo did not rely on contract terms or make claims closely intertwined with the contract. Under California law, the manufacturer's warranty is separate from the Dealer's contract terms.

 

Arbitration, Nonsignatories, Equitable Estoppel, International, Choice Of Law: 9th Cir. Affirms District Court's Order Denying Motion To Compel Arbitration Pursuant To NY Convention

And Judge Bea Dissents.

        In Setty v. Shrinivas Sugandhalaya LLP, No. 18-35573 (9th Cir. 7/7/21) (Nelson, Rawlinson; Bea, dsst.), the court holds that the district court did not  abuse its discretion by rejecting defendant SS Mumbai's argument that  plaintiff SS Bangalore should be equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration. Defendant SS Mumbai was a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement contained in a  partnership deed to which plaintiff SS Bangalore was a  party. Because it was not a party to the arbitration agreement, which was contained in a document executed in India by Indian parties, SS Mumbai tried to rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel to argue that if the plaintiff was claiming the benefits of the partnership deed, it  could not equitably disclaim its obligation to arbitrate. (Quisensit commodum debet et sentire onus.)   But the Ninth Circuit concluded plaintiff's intellectual property federal claims were not  sufficiently intertwined with the  partnership deed, and as a result, the court could not look to the partnership deed to determine whether Indian law should apply to decide the estoppel question. Instead, the court concluded federal common law governs, and decided under federal common law that the facts did not support equitable estoppel.

        Dissenting, Judge Bea wrote: "I would hold, simply, that  whether a particular contract is governed by the New York Convention or not, a nonsignatory's equitable estoppel claim to compel arbitration is brought pursuant to the FAA, which requires that state contract law (or in the case of a foreign contract, perhaps the foreign state's contract law, depending on the state's choice of law rules) govern the issue."

        Comment: This case has a lively procedural history. In a prior opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that SS Mumbai, the defendant and non-signatory to a partnership deed that contained an arbitration provision, could not equitably estop plaintiff SS Bangalore from avoiding arbitration. (See my 1/23/21 post on this case). The Supreme Court granted cert, remanding for further consideration in light of GE Energy Power Conversion Power France SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1637 (2020). GE Energy held the New York Convention does not conflict with enforcing arbitration agreements by non-signatories under domestic-law equitable estoppel doctrines. The Ninth Circuit took up the case again, leading to the current majority opinion and dissent. Given the lengthy dissent, might the procedural history still have legs?