California Mediation and Arbitration

Automobiles, Nonsignatories: Hyundai Is Unable To Piggback Onto Dealership's Arbitration Agreement

California Court of Appeal, 3rd District, Disagrees With California Court of Appeal, 3rd District.

        A Third District California Court of Appeal panel composed of Justices Renner, Earl, and Hull, disagrees with an earlier Third District panel composed of Justices Hoch, Robie, and Murray. The issue is whether an automobile manufacturer can rely on an arbitration agreement between a dealership and a customer to compel the customer to arbitrate a breach of warranty claim with the nonsignatory automobile manufacturer. The earlier case, Dina C. Felisilda et al., v. FCA US LLC, 53 Cal.App.5th 486 (2020), held that the manufacturer could rely, because the customer had to rely on the contract with the dealer to sue the manufacturer. We posted about the Felisilda case on 8/29/20.

        In light of developing case law, Justice Renner, writing for the court, disagrees with Felisilda. The customer's claim that the manufacturer breached its warranty does not rely on the customer's contract with the dealership. The manufacturer's warranty is not part of the dealership contract. Mark Kielar v. Superior Ct. of Placer County (Hyundai Motor America, Real Party in Interest), C096773 (3rd Dist. 8/16/23).

Scope, Equitable Estoppel: 9th Circuit Holds Discrimination Claims Were Outside Scope Of Arbitration, And Equitable Estoppel Prevented Bank From Arguing Borrower Couldn't Opt Out

There Were Two Agreements To Arbitrate And Neither Worked.

        Iliana Perez entered into two arbitration agreements: one, with Citibank in 2010 in connection with a student loan, the second, with Discover Bank in 2018, in connection with a consolidation loan for her student loan. She sued Discover Bank after her application for a consolidation loan was denied in, based on her undocumented immigration status. Discover Bank moved unsuccessfully in the trial court to compel arbitration under the two arbitration agreements, a result that was affirmed on appeal. Perez v. Discover Bank, 22-15322 (9th Cir.  7/24/23) (S.R. Thomas, Holly Thomas, Rakoff).

        The dispute centered around the denial of the consolidation loan, which occurred some eight years after Perez entered into the arbitration agreement relating to the student loan. The consolidation loan was not within the scope of the earlier agreement.

        As for the second agreement, Perez argued that it was unconscionable. However, in court, Discover Bank's attorney argued that it could not be unconscionable, because Perez still had 30 days to opt out. After the hearing, Perez did opt out of arbitration under the second agreement. After Perez opted out, the court addressed the matter again. Now Discover Bank's attorney argued that Perez's exercise of her opt out only applied to future discrimination, not past discrimination. But that position was inconsistent with the earlier representation to the court, and the Ninth Circuit invoked the doctrine of equitable estoppel to reject Discover Bank's argument that Perez could not opt out of arbitration for past discrimination. Indeed, Discover Bank's argument that the second agreement was not unconscionable relied, at least in part, on its representation to the court that Perez could still opt out. So it would have been unfair not to hold the bank to a representation upon which the court had earlier relied.

Nonsignatories: Second Dist., Div. 7 Holds Ford Motor Company Cannot Compel Arbitration Under Dealership Contract

Second District, Div. 7 Sides With Second Dist., Div. 8, Rejects Reasoning In Third District Case.

        Rejecting equitable estoppel and third-party beneficiary theories, the Court of Appeal holds that Ford Motor Company cannot piggyback on to the arbitration provision in a dealership contract, and thus Ford is unable to compel arbitration with the buyer of its vehicle. The plaintiff's claim for breach of express warranty against Ford was not based on or intertwined with the dealership's contract with the buyer. In fact, the dealership contract provided it offered no express manufacturer's warranties, though the manufacturer, Ford, could do so. Rosanna Montemayor et al. v. Ford Motor Company, B20477 (2/7  6/26/23) (Feuer, Perluss, Escalante).

        The opinion is in line with the reasoning in the Ford Motor Warranty Cases, 89 Cal.App.5th 1324 (2023) [see my 5/3/23 post] and at odds with the reasoning in Felisilda v. FCA US LLC , 53 Cal.App.5th 486 (2020) [see my 8/29/2020 post]. 

Non-Signatories' Efforts To Compel Arbitration Based On Equitable Estoppel, Agency, and Third-Party Bene Theories All Failed

The Trial Judge Said He Had An Issue Of First Impression.

        Jessica Hernandez sued Meridian Management Services, LLC and other entities for employment violations. The defendants sought to piggyback on to an arbitration agreement that Ms. Hernandez had entered into with her employer Intelex in order to compel her to arbitrate. Her lawyer, however, was careful with the pleadings, for Hernandez apparently did not name Intelex as a party, nor did she claim that Intelex and her other employers, the defendants (Other Firms) were joint employers. The trial judge denied the motion of the Other Firms to compel arbitration based on a contract with an arbitration agreement they had not signed. And the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was right. Hernandez v. Meridian Management Services, LLC, B312814 (2/8  1/30/23) (Wiley, Stratton, Grimes).

        It was not as if there was no relationship between Intelex and the Other Firms. After all, Ms. Hernandez worked for both. Moreover, though the Other Firms were separate legal entities from Intelex, they were "functionally related." Hernandez "alleged the Other Firms shared the same legal and physical address; the same human resources person; the same controller; the same payroll department; the same risk management and legal services; and the same centralized information technology." But whatever the functional relationships, they were not enough for defendants to compel arbitration based on theories of equitable estoppel, agency, or third party beneficiary.

        Equitable estoppel. This is the issue that led the trial judge to state he had an issue of first impression on his hands: “[t]ypically the doctrine of equitable estoppel is applied where a signatory has sued both another signatory and certain non-signatories on identical claims. . . . [¶] But what happens if the other party to the contract is not also a party to the case, and never was?" Intelex, the party with the arbitration agreement in its contract, was not a party to the case, yet it was the Intelex agreement that the Other Firms wished to take advantage of. In any case, the Court of Appeal concluded that equitable estoppel could not apply because there was no evidence Hernandez was trying to take advantage of anything she had done wrong.

        Agency. The Other Firms offered no evidence that they were empowered to act on behalf of Intelex.

        Third-party beneficiary. There was no evidence that it was a motivating purpose of Intelex and Hernandez to provide a benefit for a third party.

        Affirmed.

 

Arbitration, Equitable Estoppel: Non-Signatory Plaintiffs Are Not Required By Equitable Estoppel To Arbitrate

First District Division 1 Explains What Will And What Will Not Result In Equitable Estoppel Requiring Non-Signatory To Arbitrate.

        After plaintiffs in coordinated cases hired the Fertility Center (Pacific) to provide fertility-related services, a tank used by Pacific to freeze eggs failed. The tank was manufactured by Chart, Inc., (Chart), and sold to Pacific by Praxair, which also helped with installation. Plaintiffs' contract with Pacific included an arbitration provision, and thus plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate claims with Pacific. Naturally, defendants Chart and Praxair tried to piggyback onto Pacific's arbitration agreement. Though Chart and Praxair were non-signatories to the arbitration agreement, they argued that plaintiffs were equitably estopped from refusing to arbitrate. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeal rejected Chart's and Praxair's effort to compel arbitration. Pacific Fertility Cases, A158155 (1/1  pub. 12/1/22) (Banke, Margulies, Devine).

        Chart and Praxair argued that but for plaintiffs' contract with Pacific, their claim against Chart and Praxair would never have arisen. The case is helpful because it explains that this "but-for test" is insufficient to establish equitable estoppel. In explaining why the "but-for test" was insufficient, Justice Banke distinguished the situation from that in a case in which consumers had sued Apple and AT&T for allegedly conniving to get consumers to subscribe to a network and buy an Apple phone that could not be used properly with the network. In the case involving Apple, the court had found that the consumers were equitably estopped from refusing to arbitrate. 

        Here, however, the situation was different: "[A]s the court correctly stated, the analysis is not a simple 'but for' test, but whether plaintiffs’ claims demonstrate ' "actual reliance on the terms of the [Pacific] agreement[s] to impose liability." '  Plaintiffs’ claims against Chart and Praxair do not rely on the terms of their agreements with Pacific.  Nor do plaintiffs allege concerted action or an ongoing relationship among Pacific, Praxair, and Chart.  Thus, the circumstances here are distinguishable from those in Appel II."

Arbitration, Nonsignatories, Equitable Estoppel: Ninth Circuit Holds Nonsignatory BMW Could Not Enforce Dealer's Arbitration Agreement With Customer

Nonsignatories Can Sometimes Enforce An Arbitration Agreement Based On A Third-Party Beneficiary Or  Equitable Estoppel Theory - But Such Was Not The Case Here.

         After Kim Ngo purchased a BMW that Ngo alleged was a lemon, BMW sought to enforce an arbitration agreement between the Dealer and Ngo, to which BMW was not a signatory. The trial court agreed that BMW was a third-party beneficiary that could enforce the agreement. The Ninth Circuit reversed.  A significant fact is that Ngo sued BMW for breach of warranty, but did not sue the Dealer under the agreement containing the arbitration provision. Ngo v. BMW of North America, No. 20-56027 (9th Cir.  1/13/22) (Parker, sitting by desig., Wardlaw, Hurwitz).

        For the three-part third-party beneficiary test applied by Judge Parker, which the panel concluded BMW failed, see Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC, 6 Cal. 5th 817 (2019) (third-party must benefit from contract; contracting parties must have "motivating purpose" to benefit third-party; enforcement must be consistent with "reasonable expectations" of the contracting parties and contract objectives).

        As to "equitable estoppel", (a) there was not concerted misconduct between BMW and the Dealer; (b) Ngo did not rely on contract terms or make claims closely intertwined with the contract. Under California law, the manufacturer's warranty is separate from the Dealer's contract terms.

 

Arbitration, Nonsignatories, Equitable Estoppel, International, Choice Of Law: 9th Cir. Affirms District Court's Order Denying Motion To Compel Arbitration Pursuant To NY Convention

And Judge Bea Dissents.

        In Setty v. Shrinivas Sugandhalaya LLP, No. 18-35573 (9th Cir. 7/7/21) (Nelson, Rawlinson; Bea, dsst.), the court holds that the district court did not  abuse its discretion by rejecting defendant SS Mumbai's argument that  plaintiff SS Bangalore should be equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration. Defendant SS Mumbai was a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement contained in a  partnership deed to which plaintiff SS Bangalore was a  party. Because it was not a party to the arbitration agreement, which was contained in a document executed in India by Indian parties, SS Mumbai tried to rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel to argue that if the plaintiff was claiming the benefits of the partnership deed, it  could not equitably disclaim its obligation to arbitrate. (Quisensit commodum debet et sentire onus.)   But the Ninth Circuit concluded plaintiff's intellectual property federal claims were not  sufficiently intertwined with the  partnership deed, and as a result, the court could not look to the partnership deed to determine whether Indian law should apply to decide the estoppel question. Instead, the court concluded federal common law governs, and decided under federal common law that the facts did not support equitable estoppel.

        Dissenting, Judge Bea wrote: "I would hold, simply, that  whether a particular contract is governed by the New York Convention or not, a nonsignatory's equitable estoppel claim to compel arbitration is brought pursuant to the FAA, which requires that state contract law (or in the case of a foreign contract, perhaps the foreign state's contract law, depending on the state's choice of law rules) govern the issue."

        Comment: This case has a lively procedural history. In a prior opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that SS Mumbai, the defendant and non-signatory to a partnership deed that contained an arbitration provision, could not equitably estop plaintiff SS Bangalore from avoiding arbitration. (See my 1/23/21 post on this case). The Supreme Court granted cert, remanding for further consideration in light of GE Energy Power Conversion Power France SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1637 (2020). GE Energy held the New York Convention does not conflict with enforcing arbitration agreements by non-signatories under domestic-law equitable estoppel doctrines. The Ninth Circuit took up the case again, leading to the current majority opinion and dissent. Given the lengthy dissent, might the procedural history still have legs?

Arbitration: On Issue Of First Impression, 9th Circuit Holds Arbitration Obligations Survived Contract Termination

Shivkov v Artex Risk Solutions Arises From Tax Shelter Gone Sideways . . .

        The numerous Plaintiffs in Shivkov, et al v. Artex Risk Solutions, Inc., et al, No. 19-16746 (9th Cir.  9/9/20) (Smith, Fisher, Hawkins), probably felt that the Artex Risk Solutions was a misnomer by the time they brought suit. Defendants allegedly set up and managed "captive" insurance companies owned by Plaintiffs, to which Plaintiffs paid insurance premiums, claiming the insurance premiums as tax-deductible business expenses without recognizing them as income. Evidently the IRS had other ideas, for as the Court of Appeals wryly observes, "Although this arrangement offered the prospect of tax benefits, that prospect proved fleeting." After having to deal with an audit, delinquency notices, and threatened penalties, Plaintiffs brought suit against Defendants, alleging that the captive insurance companies "were illegal and abusive tax shelters, about which Defendants failed to inform or  advise Plaintiffs." Risk solutions too good to be true?

        Defendants, including some non-signatories, moved to compel arbitration, the trial court granted Defendants' motion to compel, and Plaintiffs appealed.

        The most interesting part of the opinion is "an issue of first impression in our circuit concerning the survival of arbitration obligations following contract termination," as to which the Court of Appeals holds: "the Agreements do not expressly negate the presumption in favor of post-termination arbitration or clearly imply that the parties did not intend for their arbitration obligations to survive termination." So the arbitration obligations survived. If arbitration obligations did not regularly survive contract termination, a party could always avoid arbitration by terminating a contract.

        The Court also held that Arizona state law recognized no fiduciary duty to point out and fully explain an arbitration clause. The arbitration clause encompassed all Plaintiffs' claims here. The availability of class arbitration was a gateway issue to be decided by the court, because there was no "clear and unmistakable" delegation of that issue to the arbitrator. And because the agreements were silent about class arbitration, they did not permit class arbitration. Finally, non-signatories, who were sued for alleged wrongs that arose from the contracts between the parties that Plaintiffs relied upon to bring suit, could invoke the arbitration clause.

        Affirmed.

        COMMENT: The slip opinion is 36 pages long. I appreciate the Court's concise enumeration of  its resolution of the issues at the beginning of the opinion.

Arbitration, Equitable Estoppel: 9th Circuit Holds Equitable Estoppel Could Not Be Used To Compel Nonsignatories To Arbitrate, Because The Nonsignatories Did Not Allege Claims Under A Contract, But Rather Under the ADA

Plaintiffs Sued Uber Technologies Under The ADA Because It Did Not Provide Accessible Ride Sharing In New Orleans.

        The interesting set of facts in Namisnak v. Uber Technologies et al., No. 18-15860 (9th Cir. 8/24/20) (Nelson, J.), is that the disabled plaintiffs who sued Uber under the ADA because Uber failed to provide an accessible ride sharing program (uberWAV) in New Orleans, failed to make use of the Uber app. And it is using the Uber app that binds the user to an arbitration agreement. By stating claims against Uber, yet not making use of the Uber app, could the plaintiffs nevertheless be bound to arbitrate by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, because it would be unfair for the nonsignatory to rely "on an agreement for one purpose while disavowing the arbitration clause of the agreement."

        Here, the plaintiffs did not rely on an agreement with Uber to state their claims. Instead, they relied solely on the Americans with Disabilities Act, and thus equitable estoppel did not apply. Hence, they could not be required to arbitrate.

        COMMENT: The court states that "the dispositive distinction in this case", which distinguishes it from similar cases, is that Uber does not offer the uberWAV at all in New Orleans. If Uber did, it would the make sense "that a plaintiff would be required to download the Uber App so that a proper comparison of available services may be made in support of an alleged ADA claim."  Under those circumstances, the plaintiff who downloaded the App would be treated as a signatory, and  presumably the plaintiff who skipped the reasonable step of downloading the App would be equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration.

Arbitration, Nonsignatories, Automobiles: Third District Affirms Confirmation Of Arbitrator's Award In Favor Of Nonsignatory

The Court Distinguishes Or Refuses To Follow Similar Cases Involving Nonsignatories.

    The Court affirms the confirmation of  an arbitrator's award in favor of a nonsignatory auto manufacturer in Dina C. Felisilda et al., v. FCA US LLC, No. C086043 (3rd Dist.  7/24/20) (Hoch, Robie, Murray) (filed 7/24, certified for publication 8/14/20). "The Felisildas' claim against [the manufacturer] directly relates to the condition of the vehicle that they allege to have violated warranties they received as a consequence of the sales contract [with the dealer]. Because the Felisildas expressly agreed to arbitrate claims arising out of the condition of the vehicle -- even against third party nonsignatories to the sales contract -- they are estopped from refusing to arbitrate their claim against [the manufacturer]."