California Mediation and Arbitration

Arbitration, Health Care: An LPS Conservatorship Only Confers Authority To Make Health Decisions, Not To Bind The Patient To Arbitrate

An LPS Conservatorship Only Created Authority To Make Decisions Concerning Health Care And Treatment, Not Authority To Agree To Arbitration.

        Health care facilities are a fertile breeding ground for problems enforcing arbitration agreements. The problems usually stem from deciding who has authority to agree to arbitration, who has capacity, and whether the claims to be arbitrated are survival actions or wrongful death actions. Our next case, a tragic case, involves such issues.

        In Enmark v. KC Community Care, LLC, B333022 (2/2  9/25/24) (Lui, J.), the plaintiffs, Scott Enmark and Marilyn Warhol, sued KC Community Care following the death of their daughter, Lisa Enmark, who was under an LPS (Lanterman-Petris-Short) conservatorship due to mental illness. Lisa was a resident at Community Care Center, where Scott signed two arbitration agreements on her behalf. After Lisa was sexually assaulted at the facility and died days later, her parents brought both wrongful death and survivor claims against the facility. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the agreements Scott signed.

        The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding that Scott lacked the authority to bind Lisa to arbitration under the LPS conservatorship order and that the wrongful death claim was not subject to arbitration since neither Scott nor Marilyn signed the agreements in their individual capacities. The appellate court affirmed the ruling, holding that the LPS conservatorship did not grant Scott the authority to sign arbitration agreements on Lisa’s behalf as it did not involve health care decisions. The court also ruled that wrongful death claims could not be compelled into arbitration under the agreements.

        COMMENT: Survival actions are brought by the personal representative of the deceased's estate for injury to the deceased. Here, however, Lisa did not sign an arbitration agreement that would have bound her estate representative to arbitrate her claims.  As for the wrongful death claims, those were personal to Lisa's surviving family members. However, Marilyn hadn't signed an arbitration agreement. And Scott did not sign in his individual capacity. He signed under the LPS conservatorship to admit Lisa for care. An LPS conservatorship is a legal arrangement where a conservator is appointed for individuals who are gravely disabled due to mental illness, allowing the conservator to make decisions regarding the person's care and treatment but not to waive legal rights such as jury trials through arbitration agreements​.

        What solution would have worked to create a binding arbitration agreement? Perhaps Lisa could have signed an arbitration agreement, but she suffered from mental disability, for which a conservatorship was necessary. Had she signed, this could have created an issue of capacity. Scott and Marilyn could have signed an agreement in their personal capacities, which would have bound them to arbitrate personal wrongful death claims.

Arbitration, Enforceability: Minor's Right To Disaffirm Contract Makes Arbitration Delegation Provision Unenforceable

Defendant Electronic Arts (EA) Fails To Shoot Down Plaintiff J.R. 

        J.R., a minor, sued video game producer EA. J.R. "alleged that EA deceptively induced players of Apex Legends, 'especially impressionable minors,' to purchase digital game-specific currency in order 'to purchase cosmetic items, characters, lootboxes, and other items within the Apex Legends virtual world.'” The trial court denied EAs motion to compel arbitration and EA appealed.  J.R. v. Electronic Arts, Inc. E080414 (4/2  1/1724) (Menetrez, Fields, Raphael). 

        EA argued that the arbitration agreement clearly and unmistakably delegated the decision as to whether to arbitrate to the arbitrator.  Indeed, the trial court did not disagree with the clarity of the delegation provision. However, the trial judge concluded that J.R., invoking his right to do so under Family Code § 6170, effectively disaffirmed the entire contract, including the delegation clause. 

        EA argued that the disaffirmance was ineffective, because J.R. failed to specifically refer to the delegation provision.

        The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed. It held that the following language was effective to disaffirm the contract and every part thereof, which logically included the delegation clause: "J.R. 'disaffirm[s] the entirety of any [user agreement], contract or agreement that was accepted through [his] EA account.' J.R. II thereby unequivocally disaffirmed 'any . . . contract or agreement' that he entered into with EA through his EA account. (Italics
added.)"

¹Family Code. 6710. "Except as otherwise provided by statute, a contract of a minor may be disaffirmed by the minor before majority or within a reasonable time afterwards or, in case of the minor's death within that1 period, by the minor's heirs or personal representative."

        BONUS. Dallas episode: the big reveal. Who shot J.R.?

 

 

 

 

 

Unconscionability: Second District, Div. 8 Holds That Illegible Contract Is Fair, And Therefore Not Unconscionable

Majority Of Panel Holds That Substantive Unconscionability Was Missing. Justice Stratton Dissents. 

        Writing for the majority, Justice John Shepard Wiley Jr. explains that the above contract is enforceable, requiring the plaintiff employee to arbitrate her dispute. Though the document is manifestly illegible, Justice Wiley concludes that the contract is fair. Therefore, there is no "substantive unconscionability." And as we know, California law requires both procedural and substantive unconscionability for a contract to be unenforceable on the basis of unconscionability. Fuentes v. Empire Nissan, Inc., B314490 (2/8   4/21/23) (Wiley, Harutunian; Stratton, dissenting). 

        Justice Maria E. Stratton dissents.  She writes, " '[W]atering down' unconscionability analysis is not what I have in mind. Acknowledging the obvious is my intention. Holding a signatory to an illegible contract that is also as prolix as this one strains the concepts of mutuality, fairness and common sense. If an employee literally cannot read the contract, how is that substantively fair?"

        COMMENT: Perhaps a simpler approach than "unconscionability," which requires satisfying two prongs, is a contract formation approach. Was there ever a meeting of the minds? Was there consent to the terms of the contract, when the contract was illegible and prolix? Justice Arthur Gilbert has written, "An arbitration clause in a contract is invalid because the clause is as inconspicuous as a frog in a thicket of water lilies." Domestic Linen Supply, Inc. v. L J T Flowers, Inc., 58 Cal.App.5th 180 (2020). Here, the job seeker wouldn't see the frog or the water lilies, just a typographic mess. Thus, in addition to the two-prong unconscionability analysis, arbitration clauses can also be analyzed under a contract formation analysis.

        Suppose the prospective employee had said she wanted to come back the next day when she could read what was actually written. And the employer had replied that if she wanted to go to work, she should sign. So she signed. Then the court could have said she signed because she wanted to start work. But since that was simply evidence of additional "procedural unconscionability," everything was copacetic. Or is it?

        This case stretches to the breaking point the legal fiction that agreements to arbitrate are always a matter of consent.

Same Outcome In A Tandem Case: Mohammad Basith v. Lithia Motors, Inc., B316098 (2/8  4/21/23) (Wiley, Harutunian; Stratton, dissenting).

        In Basith, a tandem case involving a contract substantially similar to the one in the Fuentes case, the Second District, Div. 8, reaches the same conclusion that the arbitration provision is valid and enforceable. It's another split decision, with Wiley and Harutunian in the majority, and Stratton again dissenting.

        Here, we get bit of policy to justify the outcome: "Our holding is that, unless we are to imperil the vast online world of take-it-or-leave-it contracts, substantive unconscionability must retain meaningful independent content. For that reason, the contracts here and in Fuentes are valid and enforceable, despite their procedural unconscionability."

        COMMENT: While it is true that the contracts are substantially the same, there is a factual difference between Basith and Fuentes. "We note at the outset that this case poses no issue of small or unreadable font. It is a striking coincidence that, not only do we encounter substantially similar form contracts in two simultaneous and otherwise unrelated cases, but also that font size should be a dominating issue in one case—Fuentes—and entirely absent as an issue in Basith’s case. The difference stems from the media: in Fuentes, the contract was printed only on paper, and was printed in a largely unreadable way, whereas Basith’s main contract was online."

        Nevertheless, Justice Wiley explains that a complaint about prolix legalese and a complaint about font size are just examples of procedural unconscionability, not substantive unconscionability. In short, the court majority does not recognize a situation in which the employer drafts a contract and thus knows its terms, and an employee is unable to read the illegible contract, as being one-sided and substantively unfair. This appears to be dictum in Basith, but it helps to further explain the majority's thinking in Fuentes, where font size and prolixity were issues, not to mention the poor condition of the tiny font.

 

 

Existence Of Agreement: There Is No Agreement Where Nursing Home Stroke Victim Lacked Capacity To Contract

Nursing Homes Continue To Create Arbitration Problems.

        If our readers use the sidebar search box, they will discover other cases involving nursing homes. Sometimes the problem of enforcing an arbitration agreement involving a nursing home resident arises because a relative signs for the resident, and issues arise as to whether the relative had authority to bind the non-signatory. Here, it was the resident himself, a stroke victim, who signed the agreement. However, there was substantial evidence that he was mentally impaired and lacked the ability to contract. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order denying the skilled nursing home's petition to compel arbitration. Pemilady Algo-Heyres v. Oxford Manor, LP, B319601 (2/6  2/28/23) (Baltodano, Gilbert, Yegan). A rebuttable presumption exists that all persons have the capacity to make decisions and to be responsible for their acts or decisions. 

Enforceability, FAA Preemption: Second Dist. Div. 7 Holds That Failure To File Fictitious Business Name Statement Makes Arbitration Agreement Unenforceable -- With A Wrinkle

The Wrinkle Is That After A Year, Defendant/Appellant Filed A Fictitious Business Name Statement.

       Wrinkles. "Val Morgan, a retired attorney for the U.S. agency that oversees federal health-care payments, relaxes with two of her three wrinkly-faced, short-muzzle pug dogs, 14-year old Loretta, left, and 17-year-old Gus." Library of Congress. Photographer: Carol M. Highsmith.

        Plaintiff Albert Villareal sued his employer after he injured his knee and his employer terminated his employment. The employer moved to compel arbitration. The trial court and the Court of Appeal both agreed that the employer's failure to file a fictitious business name statement prevented it from enforcing an arbitration provision at the time defendant moved to compel arbitration. Albert Villareal v. LAD-T, LLC et al, No. B313681 (2/7  10/27/22) (Feuer, Perluss, Segal).

        Business and Professions  Code § 17918 provides that a party who fails to file a valid fictitious business name statement cannot “maintain any action upon or on account of any contract made . . . in the fictitious business name in any court of this state until the fictitious business name statement” has been filed. Section 17918 would be dispositive, but for the fact that the failure to file the fictitious business statement only abates the action (in this case, a motion to compel arbitration, i.e., a suit in equity to compel performance of the arbitration agreement). And here, the defendant corrected the problem a year after filing its motion to compel.

        So the Court of Appeal vacated the order denying the motion to compel arbitration, and remanded with directions. Plaintiff Villareal can argue in the trial court on remand that defendant LAD-T, LLC's year delay in filing a fictitious business name statement resulted in waiver of the right to arbitrate, an issue that the trial court would then need to decide.

        COMMENT: Why isn't the § 17918 requirement to file a fictitious business name statement preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, since the FAA applied to this case? As the Court of Appeal explains, the requirement to file a fictitious business name statement doesn't uniquely burden a motion to compel arbitration, because it also applies to the filing of lawsuits in general.

 

Arbitration, Severability, Public Policy: Second Dist. Div. 8 Holds Arbitration Provision In Attorney Fee Dispute Was Enforceable, Though Attorney Unlicensed In California Had Done Some Work For Client

Just Because Some Work Was Done By An Attorney Not Licensed In California Doesn't Necessarily Mean The Arbitration Agreement Or The Fee Agreement Is Unenforceable.

        Plaintiff Mark Brawerman sued Loeb & Loeb, arguing the law firm failed to protect his interests in  negotiating with the venture capital firm Wasserstein & Co., resulting in the eventual loss of control of his successful business TMI marketing healthy frozen food desserts. As a result of the arbitration agreement in his retention agreement with Loeb & Loeb, the parties arbitrated. Brawerman was unhappy with the result. Learning that a substantial amount of Loeb & Loeb's services (382 of 928 hours) had been performed by an attorney unlicensed to practice law in California (but licensed in other states), Brawerman argued his agreement with Loeb & Loeb was against public policy, the arbitrator had exceeded the scope of his powers by proceeding under an invalid arbitration agreement, and the arbitration award should therefore be vacated rather than confirmed. The arbitration award was confirmed, and Brawerman's appeal followed. Mark Brawerman et al. v. Loeb & Loeb LLP et al, B305802 (2/8  8/3/22) (Harutunian, Grimes, Wiley).

        The Court of Appeal affirmed, based on its analysis of two key cases: Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc., 6 Cal.5th 59 (2018) and Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court,  17 Cal.4th 119 (1998).

        Sheppard held that the retention of the law firm, which happened to result in a severe conflict of interest, could be invalid as against public policy, resulting in a loss of attorney fees. In Brawerman, the court limited Sheppard by explaining Sheppard applied to a situation where a breach of professional ethics infected the entire agreement from its inception. Birbrower, like Brawerman, involved a situation in which an attorney unlicensed in California performed work for a California client. While the California Supreme Court held that the Birbrower firm could not collect under the contract for work illegally performed in California by New York attorneys, it did not void the entire retention agreement, because it was possible that some of the work had been properly done by New York attorneys in New York, and that work might be severable from the work illegally performed.

        Unlike in Sheppard, in Brawerman there was no conflict of interest, nor was there a basis for finding that the retention agreement was improper from the beginning. In fact, but for the fact that an attorney unlicensed in California had performed some of the work in Brawerman, there would have been no basis for attacking the fees. Loeb & Loeb has plenty of California attorneys who could have been enlisted to do work for a California client under the retention agreement. Similar to Birbrower, the work improperly done by the attorney unlicensed in California, which involved filing an arbitration demand, might be separated from the work done by licensed California attorneys. The agreement in Brawerman need not be entirely invalid if work that was done properly can be severed from work that was done improperly. 

            The Court of Appeal affirmed the confirmation of the arbitration award in Brawerman.

        COMMENT: Interestingly, the award in Brawerman resulted in disgorgement of fees to plaintiffs in the amount $138,075 for work done by the unlicensed attorney, and fees incurred in the arbitration of $94,833. So the retention agreement and arbitration agreement were legal, but the work done by the attorney unlicensed in California was not compensable. But this was surely small potatoes for Brawerman, who believed his attorneys had not protected him properly, resulting in loss of control over a multi-million dollar company, and who therefore wanted to undo the arbitration award in its entirety. 

        Out-of-state attorneys are, of course, happy to know that California fixed the problem after Birbrower regarding out-of-state participation in arbitrations. California now has what is essentially a "pro hac vice" approach to out-of-state attorneys wishing to participate in California arbitrations. Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 1282.4.

 

 

 

Arbitration, Enforceability: No Agreement Where Company Was Unable To Establish Automatic Sending Of Electronic Receipt

Existence Of Agreement Was Not An Issue To Delegate To Arbitrator.   

              Fiona Trinity sued Life Insurance Company of North America and individuals (LINA parties) for employment-related claims. The LINA Parties moved unsuccessfully to compel arbitration in the trial court, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The LINA parties could not establish the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, and even if they could, the agreement would have been unconscionable. Trinity v. Life Insurance Company of America et al., B312302 (2/7  5/23/22) (Perluss, Segal, Feuer).

        The defendant's PMK had testified as to the contract procedure, explaining that  once the employee had  clicked on a link indicating he or she had read an online employee handbook, which included an arbitration agreement, they would receive an email confirming their assent to the terms of the handbook. The problem was that the employer could not produce the automatically generated receipt and did not know how to retrieve it, and the employee did not remember reading or agreeing to the handbook. 

        While issues of arbitrability were delegated to the arbitrator here, whether there is an agreement to arbitrate in the first place is an issue for the judge to decide. The issue of arbitrability cannot be delegated under the terms of a nonexistent agreement.

        COMMENT: In the 21st century, there is still at least one advantage to the use of a paper document with an inked signature. Electronic signing is permissible, but then one must carefully follow procedure and have a good storage and retrieval system for electronic data.

Arbitration, Enforceability, Employment: Ninth Circuit Holds Arbitration Agreement Enforceable Against Farm Worker Because No Economic Duress

Just Following The Law, Or Gaslighting?

        Farmworker Martinez-Gonzalez, on behalf of himself and other employees, brought a wage and hour lawsuit against a farm labor contractor and a grower. The district court held that defendants could not enforce an arbitration agreement, because the employee had signed under economic duress or undue influence. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed, holding that economic duress or undue influence did not exist, because the employer did not commit a "wrongful act" and because the employee was not unusually susceptible. Judge Rawlinson dissented, arguing the district court provided detailed factual findings on which its decision was based, and the majority failed to give proper deference to the district court's findings. Martinez-Gonzalez v. Elkhorn Packing Co., LLC, et al, No. 19-17311 (9th Cir.  11/3/21) (Bumatay, Siler; Rawlinson (dissent)).

        The majority and dissenting opinions make for interesting reading. Judge Bumatay, author of the majority opinion, wrote: "The dissent disagrees largely based on Martinez-Gonzalez’s socioeconomic background." He also insisted it was the court's duty to follow the law, not its sympathies. Judge Rawlinson retorted, "The majority’s suggestion that 'facts don’t matter' to me or to the district court . . . is nothing short of gaslighting." And she includes a definition of gaslighting taken from Wikipedia: "The term “[g]aslighting is . . . used informally to describe someone who persistently puts forth [a] false narrative” in an effort to cause “another person to doubt [her] own perceptions. . . .”

        The district court did make detailed factual findings, noting that the employee was transported in a twelve-hour bus trip from Mexico, that he signed the arbitration agreement in a parking lot of the hotel where the employer was putting him up, that no explanation was provided to him, and that he had a reasonable belief that if he did not sign, he would not be able to find another  job. The majority points out that the facts do not amount to a crime or a tort, and fall short of other cases in which contracts have been rescinded because of economic duress or undue influence. The dissent points out that a tort or a crime is not required to find undue influence or economic duress, that the district court judge made detailed findings, and that the court should have deferred to the findings and to reasonable inferences from the findings.

        COMMENT: The case is interesting because the facts occupy a liminal space: they do not amount to a tort or a crime, and yet as the majority artfully puts it, the circumstances for signing the arbitration agreement were "not ideal." So the question presented is: what facts, falling short of crime or tort, will constitute a wrongful act?

        The case is another example of a decision involving a pre-dispute arbitration provision in which the judges' respective views line up with the party of the President who appointed them: Bumatay (Trump), Siler (George H. W. Bush), Rawlinson (Clinton).

        The case also provides an example of that much repeated proposition that arbitration is voluntary and consistent with freedom of contract -- a proposition necessary to uphold the enforceability of arbitration agreements, while at the same  time serving as a legal fiction.

        Finally, it is worth noting that the enforceability of the arbitration provision in this case depends on whether there is undue influence or economic duress. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1689(b)(1). This is different from unconscionability, the more common defense to contract enforceability. In California, unconscionability has two prongs: procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability. But rescinding a contract based on economic duress or undue influence does not require substantive unconscionability. 

"Visalia (vicinity), Tulare County, California. The Farm Security Administration. Miners's cooperative farm. Ten families have been established on the old ranch of 500 acres, which they operate as a farm unit, raising cotton alfalfa and dairy products for cash crops." Dorothea Lange, photographer. November 1938. Library of Congress.

Arbitrability, Delegation, Enforceability, Jurisdiction, Unconscionability: A Trifecta of Ninth Circuit Published Opinions

August 12, 2021 Was A Day Rich In 9th Circuit Arbitration Decisions.

Santiago Lim v. TForce Logistics, LLC, No. 20-55564 (9th Cir.  8/12/21) (Smith, Owens, Robreno).

        This case is about the gateway decision of arbitrability, delegation of that decision, and unconscionability. The panel holds that the delegation and arbitration clauses are procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Because the delegation clause is unconscionable, the court, not the arbitrator, gets to decide whether the arbitration clause  is enforceable, and agrees that that too is unconscionable. The provisions are "take it or  leave it", require costs splitting between the employer and the purported "independent contractors", call for  fee-splitting, and have a Texas venue provision.

CLMS Management Services LP v Amwins Brokerage of Georgia, 20-35428 (9th Cir. 8/12/21) (Christen, Hawkins, McKeown).

        This case presents an international law question: does the doctrine of reverse-preemption apply to a clause in an insurance contract, such that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, a multilateral treaty, is  preempted by a Washington State rule that arbitration clauses in insurance contracts are not enforceable? Ordinarily, state law applies to insurance contracts, and in fact the McCarran-Ferguson Act can operate to reverse-preempt laws that contradict state law. However, in the case of treaties, a rule applies that  treaties that are "self-enforcing" are not preempted by state law. What does that  mean?

        A treaty is "self-enforcing" if it can be directly enforced in court  without the need for implementing legislation. The panel holds that the Convention the the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign is self-enforcing. And therefore, reverse preemption does not  apply. And because Washington State law cannot be applied to invalidate the arbitration provision, it is enforceable.

Al-Qarqani v. Chevron, No. 19-17074 (9th Cir. 8/12/21) (Thomas, Kelly, Miller). 

        No small potatoes here, as the panel affirms the district court's refusal to allow enforcement of an $18,000,000,000 Egyptian arbitration award against Chevron. The core ruling is about jurisdiction.

        The heirs of an official who entered into a land concession agreement with Chevron in 1949 claimed entitlement to rent, and evidently the Egyptian arbitrators agreed. But when it  came time to petition to enforce the arbitral award under an arbitration agreement entered into earlier in 1933, the district court held that the parties never agreed to arbitrate, and therefore it denied enforcement on the merits.

        The Court of Appeals held that the  heirs had failed to make a non-frivolous argument for jurisdiction as to Chevron USA, which was not named in the Egyptian award, and because no non-frivolous argument for jurisdiction had been made, the Court could affirm the dismissal for lack  of subject-matter jurisdiction. (If the heirs had made a non-frivolous argument in favor of jurisdiction, then the Court would have assumed subject-matter jurisdiction).

        As to Chevron Corporation, the facts were a little different. The 1949 agreement failed to incorporate the 1933 arbitration agreement. As for the 1933 agreement with the arbitration clause, it had been signed by Saudi Arabia, not the heirs, and Chevron Corporation's rights and obligations under that earlier agreement had expired. The absence of an agreement to arbitrate was a reason to dismiss the petition to enforce the award on the merits rather than for a lack of jurisdiction

 

 

 

Arbitration, Public Injunctive Relief: 9th Circuit Holds Arbitration Provision Allowing For Public Injunctive Relief, While Prohibiting Private Attorneys General, Is Enforceable

Arbitration Provision Allowing For Public Injunctive Relief Does Not Violate McGill Rule.

        The so-called McGill rule states California’s legal requirement that contracts allow public injunctive relief. So what happens if a contract requires arbitration of disputes, provides for all remedies in arbitration, and further provides that the claimant cannot act as a private attorney general? Put another way, can a claimant request public injunctive relief in California, without acting as a private attorney general? If the answer is yes, the arbitration clause is enforceable. If the answer is no, the arbitration clause is not enforceable. Yes, says the Ninth Circuit in DiCarlo v. MoneyLion, Inc., et al., No. 20-55058 (9th Cir.  2/19/21) (Thapar, Bea, Collins).

        Plaintiff DiCarlo brought claims under unfair competition law, false advertising law, and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act law against a lender being accused of predatory practices. The lender MoneyLion successfully moved to compel arbitration, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The key to enforcing the arbitration provision is that it provided for all remedies, including public injunctive relief: "In California, litigants proceeding in individual lawsuits may request public injunctive relief without becoming private attorneys general. That means that public injunctive relief is available to DiCarlo in arbitration with MoneyLion. Since the arbitration provision does not violate the McGill rule, it is valid."

        COMMENT: What  happens to attorneys fees if the claimant, who is prohibited by the contract from suing as a private attorney general, is entitled to obtain relief under the UCL, FAL, or CLRA? Technically, this case may not answer the question, because Judge Thapar points out that the plaintiff did not ask for attorneys fees. Thus, any comments about attorneys fees would be dictum. "In any case, we have no reason to think that the availability of public injunctive relief could hinge on whether those fees are up for grabs," writes Judge Thapar, adding, "Nor do we read the Agreement to bar any claims that could support fee shifting in court."  And so?