California Mediation and Arbitration

Employment, Civil Rights, FAA: The Second District, Div. 3 Applies The Ending Force Arbitration of Sexual Assault And Sexual Harassment Act

The Case Clarifies How The EFAA Should Apply To Arbitrating Cases Stradling The Effective Date Of The EFAA, And To Mixed Cases Involving Sexual Harassment And Other Claims.

        Jane Doe brought claims of sexual harassment and related violations by her employer, The Huntley Hotel. The employer sought to compel arbitration. The court ruled that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA) applies, which makes arbitration agreements unenforceable at the plaintiff's discretion in sexual harassment disputes. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order denying a motion to compel arbitration. Jane Doe v. Second Street Corp., B330281 (2/3  9/30/24) (Edmon, J.). Since Doe's harassment claims included conduct both before and after the EFAA’s effective date (March 3, 2022), the arbitration clause is invalid for her entire case, not just the sexual harassment claims. Additionally, the court determined that the arbitration provision in the employee handbook cannot be enforced for any of Doe's claims, as they are part of the same case. 

        COMMENT:  The case applies the EFAA in a significant and evolving area of employment law, regarding arbitration agreements in cases involving sexual harassment. The decision clarifies key legal points: 1. Application of the EFAA: The court interpreted how the EFAA applies to cases involving ongoing sexual harassment that straddles the act’s effective date (March 3, 2022), applying the EFAA to preclude arbitration of a case straddling the effective date.  Arbitration in Mixed Claims: The ruling emphasized that under the EFAA, arbitration agreements are unenforceable not just for the sexual harassment claims but for the entire case if any part relates to sexual harassment. This broad interpretation is significant because it would prevent employers from compelling arbitration in cases that contain a mix of claims (sexual harassment alongside other employment violations), expanding protections for plaintiffs in similar cases.

Arbitration, Health Care: An LPS Conservatorship Only Confers Authority To Make Health Decisions, Not To Bind The Patient To Arbitrate

An LPS Conservatorship Only Created Authority To Make Decisions Concerning Health Care And Treatment, Not Authority To Agree To Arbitration.

        Health care facilities are a fertile breeding ground for problems enforcing arbitration agreements. The problems usually stem from deciding who has authority to agree to arbitration, who has capacity, and whether the claims to be arbitrated are survival actions or wrongful death actions. Our next case, a tragic case, involves such issues.

        In Enmark v. KC Community Care, LLC, B333022 (2/2  9/25/24) (Lui, J.), the plaintiffs, Scott Enmark and Marilyn Warhol, sued KC Community Care following the death of their daughter, Lisa Enmark, who was under an LPS (Lanterman-Petris-Short) conservatorship due to mental illness. Lisa was a resident at Community Care Center, where Scott signed two arbitration agreements on her behalf. After Lisa was sexually assaulted at the facility and died days later, her parents brought both wrongful death and survivor claims against the facility. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the agreements Scott signed.

        The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding that Scott lacked the authority to bind Lisa to arbitration under the LPS conservatorship order and that the wrongful death claim was not subject to arbitration since neither Scott nor Marilyn signed the agreements in their individual capacities. The appellate court affirmed the ruling, holding that the LPS conservatorship did not grant Scott the authority to sign arbitration agreements on Lisa’s behalf as it did not involve health care decisions. The court also ruled that wrongful death claims could not be compelled into arbitration under the agreements.

        COMMENT: Survival actions are brought by the personal representative of the deceased's estate for injury to the deceased. Here, however, Lisa did not sign an arbitration agreement that would have bound her estate representative to arbitrate her claims.  As for the wrongful death claims, those were personal to Lisa's surviving family members. However, Marilyn hadn't signed an arbitration agreement. And Scott did not sign in his individual capacity. He signed under the LPS conservatorship to admit Lisa for care. An LPS conservatorship is a legal arrangement where a conservator is appointed for individuals who are gravely disabled due to mental illness, allowing the conservator to make decisions regarding the person's care and treatment but not to waive legal rights such as jury trials through arbitration agreements​.

        What solution would have worked to create a binding arbitration agreement? Perhaps Lisa could have signed an arbitration agreement, but she suffered from mental disability, for which a conservatorship was necessary. Had she signed, this could have created an issue of capacity. Scott and Marilyn could have signed an agreement in their personal capacities, which would have bound them to arbitrate personal wrongful death claims.

Waiver Of Right To Arbitrate Results From Delay After Agreeing To Mediate And Not Mentioning Arb Agreement

Waiver Results From Delaying Bringing Motion To Compel Arbitration Without Adequate Explanation.

        Britnee Campbell, a former employee of Sunshine Behavioral Health, LLC, filed a class action lawsuit in May 2022 for wage and hour violations. Sunshine entered into litigation and mediation discussions, without mentioning an arbitration agreement allegedly signed by Campbell. In November 2022, Sunshine claimed it discovered the arbitration agreement but continued to engage in mediation discussions. In March 2023, Sunshine announced it would not mediate and instead sought to compel arbitration. The court ruled that Sunshine had waived its right to arbitration by delaying its motion and engaging in mediation efforts, leading to Campbell’s motions to compel discovery responses. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision that Sunshine’s actions constituted a waiver of arbitration. Campbell v. Sunshine Behavioral Health, LLC, G062886 (4/3  9/25/24) (Moore, J.).

 

 

Third Party Beneficiaries: Second Dist., Div. 6 Rejects Argument Third-Party Ford Could Benefit From Arbitration Clause With Non-Party Dealer

One More Opinion Rejects Reasoning In Felisilda.

        In Rivera et al. v. Superior Court of Ventura County, B334522 (2/6  9/23/24) (Gilbert, P.J.) petitioners Rivera and Espinosa sued Ford Motor Company under California's Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the "lemon law") after their Ford F-250 truck experienced repeated mechanical issues. They also included Ford of Ventura, an authorized repair service, in their complaint but did not sue the selling dealer. FMC moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in the sale contract signed between the petitioners and the non-party dealer.

        The trial court granted FMC's motion, relying on the case Felisilda v. FCA US LLC, which allowed a manufacturer to enforce an arbitration clause as a third-party beneficiary of the sale contract. However, the petitioners sought reconsideration after several appellate courts disapproved Felisilda. The trial court denied reconsideration, citing the unresolved status of Felisilda. The petitioners then sought a writ of mandate. The appellate court ruled that Ford Motor Company was not a third-party beneficiary and that petitioners were not equitably estopped from rejecting arbitration. The appellate court thus granted the writ and ordered the trial court to vacate its order compelling arbitration.

        COMMENT. Why did the court reject Felisilda?  Unlike Felisilda, the petitioners in this case sued only the manufacturer, and not the selling dealer. The obligations under manufacturer's warranty are independent of the sale contract, and the manufacturer is neither a party to nor a beneficiary of that contract. The court emphasized that petitioners’ claims stemmed from statutory warranty obligations under the lemon law, not the sale contract, thus rendering Felisilda inapplicable. We posted on the Felisilda case way back on 8/29/20. Since then, the law has tipped against Felisilda.

Ford F-250. Photo: Scott Beeton.  Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license