California Law Requires Both Substantive And Procedural Unconscionability To Avoid Enforcement Of Arbitration Provision.
The Court of Appeal's conclusion that it was "disturbed by the manner" in which an arbitration agreement was drafted and presented to an employee for signature, and that an "extraordinarily high degree of procedural unconscionability" existed, was not enough to uphold the trial court's denial of One Toyota's petition to compel arbitration with an employee in Oto, L.L.C. v. Kho (defendant and respondent) and Su, Labor Commissioner (intervener and appellant), A147564 (1/1 8/21/17) (Margulies, Humes, Banke). Despite its manifest displeasure, the Court reversed the trial court's denial of the petition to compel arbitraiton. The Court's reasoning process is straightforward: under California law, unconscionability has both a procedural and a substantive prong, and the Court concluded that substantive unconscionability did not exist.
Regarding substantive unconscionability, the Court focused on "dual requirements of affordability and accessibility." As to affordability, One Toyota acknowledged it had to pay all costs of arbitration. The Court explained that the Agreement "does not necessarily require an expense beyond that necessary under Labor Code procedures." The chief issue with accessibility, raised by the Labor Commissioner, was that arbitration would replace "the relative simplicity of the Berman hearing [where the Labor Commissioner considers an employee wage claim] with a complex proceeding resembling civil litigation." However, the Court brushed that objection aside, observing that Berman hearings are nonbinding, and that either side could appeal, nullifying the result, and compelling civil litigation.
The degree of procedural oppression really was high. The agreement was not negotiated. It was printed in 7-point font. The plaintiff's first language was Chinese, and the agreement was presented in English without translation. The agreement was presented without explanation to someone who was already an employee, while he was at his work station, where he was expected to do his job. A low level employee presented the agreement, "creating the impression that no request for an explanation was expected and any such request would be unavailing." The Court obviously didn't like the "dense, single-spaced paragraph", because it attached it as an Appendix to the opinion. "These circumstances," the Court concluded, "were highly coercive and appear intended to thwart, rather than promote, voluntary and informed consent."
COMMENT: I have occasionally noted a disconnect between the theory of arbitration and California unconscionability law. In theory, an agreement to arbitrate is all about intent. Over and over again, the courts state the need for agreement and an intent to arbitrate. However, in California, where substantive unconscionability is required, procedural unconscionability, resulting in surprise and confusion, is not enough to nix an arbitration agreement. Instead, the employee would need to argue that he did not intend or agree to arbitrate. Where the procedural unconscionability is as high as it was in the Oto, L.L.C. v. Kho case, one wonders to what extent the employee intended and agreed to arbitrate.
I am reminded of a story I once heard about a University of Chicago Law School professor teaching the famous Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture case to his class. This is the opinion penned by Judge J. Skelly Wright addressing unconscionability as a defense to enforcement of contracts. Williams had signed an installment purchase contract for furniture, and when she defaulted in 1962, Walker-Thomas Furniture tried to repossess all furniture purchased since 1957. As the law students became increasingly unhappy with the unfairness of it all, the law professor became increasingly frustrated with his students' rebellion against enforcing the contract. Finally, the University of Chicago Law School professor exclaimed, "If she signed it, make her eat it!" Apocryphal, perhaps. Or can you name the professor?