California Mediation and Arbitration

Arbitration/Public Policy/Standard of Review: Licensing Requirement for Contractors Constitutes Explicit Legislative Expression of Public Policy, That If Not Enforced By Arbitrator, Constitutes Grounds for Judicial Review

Trial Court Must Conduct De Novo Review To Determine Whether Licensing Statute Requires Disgorgement of Compensation By Unlicensed Contractor

     Our next case addresses an important exception to the general rule that an arbitrator’s award cannot be vacated because of an error of fact or law:  the “public policy exception.”

     The setting is a condominium project that suffered numerous construction setbacks, took six years to complete, and received a Certificate of Occupancy on January 29, 2008 – bad timing.   That left Plaintiff Ahdout and Defendant Hekmatjah, the members of a company formed to develop the project, arbitrating their dispute over the accounting for distributions.  Ahdout was unhappy with the arbitrator’s award.  He appealed from a judgment entered following the superior court’s denial of his petition to vacate the arbitration award and from the court’s order confirming the award.  Ahdout v. Hekmatjah, Case No. B236764 (2nd Dist. Div. 4 January 25, 2013) (Willhite, J., author) (published).

     The fly in the ointment was Bus. & Prof. Code section 7031(b), permitting an action for disgorgement of compensation from an unlicensed contractor.  Both the person who provides construction services himself and one who does so through others qualifies as a contractor.  Ahdout claimed that Hekmatjah had provided construction services through an unlicensed general contractor.  Ahdout’s and Hekmatjah’s agreement for distribution of profits provided that Hekmatjah’s capital account would be credited more than Ahdout’s account for construction costs.  However, Ahdout opposed such a credit, based on Hekmatjah’s involvement in the alleged use of an unlicensed contractor. 

     Hekmatjah’s argument was simple: even if the arbitrator’s decision contained errors of fact or law, the trial court properly deferred to the trial court.  Though Hekmatjah correctly stated the general rule, there is an important “public policy exception,” and that was the hook upon which the Court of Appeal hung its opinion:

“We find that Ahdout’s claims under section 7031 fall within the ‘public policy’ exception to the general prohibition of judicial review of arbitration awards, because 7031 constitutes a clear-cut and explicit legislative expression of public policy mandating the disgorgement of compensation received by an unlicensed contractor.  Thus, the trial court erred in deferring to the arbitrator’s finding that section 7031 does not apply.  We remand the matter to the trial court to conduct a de novo review.”

     The Court rejected Ahdout’s other argument that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by enforcing an illegal contract, because the illegality in the instant case did not infect the entire contract.

      Blog Bonus:  The arbitral forum in this case was a “Bais Din” or “Beth Din” (“house of judgment”), a Jewish rabbinical court.

Arbitration/Standard of Review/CCP 1281.2/Nonsignatories: Nonsignatories Created Possibility of Conflicting Rulings And Also There Was Evidence That Aged Plaintiff Never Agreed To Arbitrate

Standard of Review Was Crucial To Affirmance of Trial Court’s Order Denying Motion to Compel Arbitration

     What a difference the standard of review can make. 

     Plaintiff Thiel, an investor, sued MKA Real Estate Qualified Fund I, LLC for investment mismanagement.  Several investment advisors, as well as real estate developers, were named as co-defendants.  MKA moved to compel arbitration with it, and the trial court denied the motion on grounds that Thiel had not agreed to arbitrate, and that third party signatories, who could not be compelled to arbitrate, created the possibility of conflicting rulings.  MKA appealed. Thiel v. MKA Real Estate Qualified Fund I, LLC, Case No.A131683 (1st Dist. Div. 4 November 9, 2012) (Ruvolo, P.J.) (unpublished).

     Evidence cut both ways as to whether there was an agreement to arbitrate.  However, the Plaintiff stated he was not shown a copy of an arbitration agreement, and he never agreed to arbitrate, and his wife backed him up.  If the court’s order to deny a motion to compel arbitration is based on a decision of fact, then a substantial evidence standard governs.  And here, though the evidence was disputed, Thiel’s denials amounted to substantial evidence. 

     Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. section 1281.2(c) authorizes the court to deny a request to arbitrate when arbitration may result in conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.  Applying a de novo standard of review, the Court of Appeal concluded that Plaintiffs’ allegations of agency and conspiracy “would necessarily require presenting evidence and determining the culpability of the codefendants as well as that of MKA,” as a result of which, “there exists a possibility of conflicting rulings on common issues of law and fact . . . warranting the denial of MKA’s motion to compel arbitration.”

     The Court of Appeal’s path to affirmance was made easier by its subsidiary rulings that MKA had forfeited various arguments along the way.

      Affirmed.

Arbitration/Unconscionability/Severability/Standard of Review: Law Firm Partnership Agreement That Is Functionally An Employment Agreement Is Subject To Armendariz Unconscionability Analysis

 

Court of Appeal Rejects Employer’s Contention that AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion Overruled Armendariz Unconscionability Analysis

     Plaintiff Erika Brenner, an attorney, sued her “employer” Glenn Johnson Law, LLP and its principal, attorney Glenn Johnson, for wrongful discharge and other employment-related claims.  Defendants moved to compel arbitration under a contractual arbitration provision.  Brenner opposed, arguing that the arbitration provision was unconscionable under the analysis set forth in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83 (2000).  Defendants argued Armendariz had no application, because Brenner was a partner, not an employee.  Agreeing with Brenner that the agreement was unconscionable, the trial court denied Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.  Defendants appealed.  Brenner v. Glenn Johnson Law, LLP et al., Case No. G046532 (4th Dist. Div. 3 November 5, 2012) (Rylaarsdam, Acting P.J.) (unpublished).

     The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial court’s finding that the partnership agreement was “the functional equivalent of an employment agreement” was supported by substantial evidence; thus, there was no reason to disturb the trial court’s finding.   Brenner had a 5% interest, and Johnson had a 95% interest, Johnson dictated the terms, and the agreement set forth the terms of the employment relationship. 

     “Unconscionability” analysis requires an examination of two prongs:  substantive and procedural unconscionability.  The source of substantive unconscionability here was that the agreement, which purported to cover FEHA claims, did not require the employer to bear costs unique to arbitration, nor did it contain a limitation that the employee, if she her suit, could not be burdened with fees and costs unless the employee’s suit was brought frivolously or in bad faith.  While Plaintiff and Defendants disagreed as to whether the agreement was “take it or leave it”, there was substantial evidence that Brenner did not have a meaningful opportunity to negotiate the terms – enough to support a finding of procedural unconscionability, the second prong.

     Finally, there was an issue as to whether the provision for shifting of costs and fees to the prevailing party, if unconscionable, could be severed in order to save the arbitration provision.  Because there were two problems with the unlawful fees provision, the Court concluded it was not required to reform an agreement that was “permeated” by unconscionability.  Besides, Defendants failed to ask the superior court to exercise its discretion to sever.

     Affirmed.

Arbitration/Employment/Enforceability/Standard of Review/Public Policy: Ninth Circuit Refuses to Vacate Arbitration Award Prohibiting Retired Football Player from Pursuing Workers’ Comp Claims Under California Law

 

Football Player Bruce Matthews Did Not Allege Sufficient Contacts With California To Show Workers’ Comp Claim Came Within Scope of California’s Workers’ Comp Regime

     Bruce Matthews, a former American college and professional football player, was an offensive lineman in the NFL for 19 seasons.  He played college football for  USC, was an All-American, and played professionally for the Oilers/Titan Franchise, retiring in 2002.  In 2008, Matthews filed a workers’ compensation claim in California related to injuries incurred during his career as a professional football player.  After Matthews filed his claim, the Titans and the NFL Management Council filed a grievance against Matthews, arguing he breached his employment agreement when he applied for benefits in California, because the agreement provided all workers’ compensation claims would be decided under Tennessee law.  Because the NFL collective bargaining agreement contained a binding arbitration clause, the parties arbitrated their dispute. 

     The arbitrator found the choice of law clause in the agreement constituted a promise to resolve workers compensation claims under Tennessee law, and Matthews violated the agreement by pursuing workers’ compensation claims in California.  Therefore, the arbitrator ordered Matthews to “cease and desist” from seeking California benefits.  Matthews filed suit in federal district court to vacate the arbitration award.  The district court denied Matthews’ motion, and confirmed the award.  Matthews appealed.  Matthews v. National Football League Management Council; Tennessee Titans, Case No. 11-55186 (9th Cir. August 6, 2012) (Fisher, J., author).

     The standard of review is a narrow one here:  “Arbitration awards are ordinarily upheld so long as they represent a plausible interpretation of the contract.”  Furthermore, to vacate an award on public policy grounds, “we must ‘(1) find that an explicit, well defined and dominant policy exists . . . and (2) that the policy is one that specifically militates against the relief ordered by the arbitrator.’” (Matthews, citing United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, Local 588 v. Foster Poultry Farms, 74 F.3d 169, 174 (9th Cir. 1995)).  Because the facts did not appear to be in dispute, the Court of Appeals reviewed de novo the district court’s resolution of legal questions.

     The Court of Appeals noted that one narrow exception to the rule that arbitration awards are ordinarily upheld “is when the arbitration award is contrary to public policy.”  However, even if the California Labor Code can be interpreted to bar an employer from using a contractual choice of law clause to prevent an employee from receiving workers’ compensation benefits under California law, Matthews had failed to allege sufficient contacts with California to bring his claims under California law.  Thus, “[h]e did not allege any specific injury in California or a need for medical services in California.”

     Mathews also argued that the arbitration award violated federal labor policy providing that an employee may not, through a collective bargaining agreement, bargain away state minimum labor standards.  Same problem:  “it is not clear that Matthews’ workers’ compensation claim falls within the scope of California’s workers’ compensation regime.”

     Finally, Matthews argued that the arbitrator’s award showed “manifest disregard of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.”  Hardly manifest, concluded the Court of Appeals, because California’s interest “is highly attenuated in this case.”

     One may ask why there is no express discussion of FAA preemption of a California rule that would bar contractual waiver of workers’ compensation benefits.  This is our explanation:

      First, it was unnecessary to consider preemption, because the Court of Appeals concluded that Matthews’ contacts with California were too attenuated to give him the protection of California law.  Thus, anything that the Court of Appeals would have said about federal preemption of California law would have been dictum. 

     Second, there is no preemption of state law by federal law when federal law itself provides that there is an exception to preemption.  Here, the Court of Appeals restated Matthews’ argument that federal labor policy “provides that an employee may not, through a collective bargaining agreement, bargain away state minimum labor standards.  See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 755-56 (1985).”  In other words, if this is the law, then federal labor law provides an exception to preemption by carving out agreements that bargain away state minimum labor standards. In another case, where the employee establishes contacts to California, the Court of Appeals has left itself room to reach a different conclusion, i.e., that the employee is protected by the California Labor Code and by California public policy, from waiving a right to assert California workers’ compensation claims through an arbitration clause applying Tennessee law.  However, by concluding that Matthews had failed to establish the contacts with California necessary to stake a claim under California law, the Court of Appeals did not need to delve into the effect of federal labor policy, as such a discussion was unnecessary to reach its conclusion. 

    The district court’s judgment was affirmed.

Arbitration/Preemption/Standard of Review: Federal Arbitration Act Preempts Consumer Legal Remedies Act’s Prohibition Against Class-Action Waivers

 

Fourth District, Division 3 Reverses Denial of Petition to Compel Arbitration and Remands to Consider Unconscionability Challenge

     Plaintiff Caron, who experienced difficulties with her certified preowned Mercedes Benz, sued Mercedes Financial and Mission Imports for relief under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CRLA), the Automobile Sales Finance Act, and unfair competition law.  Defendants petitioned to arbitrate under an arbitration provision that included a class-action waiver.  The trial court believed that it was bound by Fisher v. DCH Temecula Imports LLC, 187 Cal.App.4th 601 (2010), and ruled that the arbitration provision was unenforceable because it waived the right to bring a class action under the CRLA, and that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) did not preempt the CLRA’s prohibition against class-action waivers.  Caron v. Mercedes-Benz Financial Services USA LLC, Case No. G044550 (4th Dist., Div. 3 July 30, 2012) (Aronson, J., author). 

     Whether the FAA preempts the CLRA’s anti-waiver rule is a legal question.  Therefore, the Court of Appeal reviewed the trial court’s ruling de novo.

     Based on AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011),the Court of Appeal agreed that the FAA preempts the CLRA’s anti-waiver provision, and declined to follow Fisher.  Therefore, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling that denied the petition to arbitrate, but remanded for the trial court to resolve factual issues raised by Caron’s unconscionability challenge.

     The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the California Supreme Court created the “Discover Bank rule,” used to find certain arbitration provisions in consumer contracts unconscionable because they included a waiver of the consumer’s right to bring a class action.   The reason for the Discover Bank rule was that “consumer contracts of adhesion allowed companies to effectively exonerate themselves from liability for cheating large numbers of consumers out of money individually too small for a consumer to bring an individual action.”  But Concepcion took a different paths.

     Properly drafted class-action waivers may be enforceable, requiring consumers to arbitrate substantive claims brought under the CRLA. 

     Caron highlights two themes in recent cases:  (1) the FAA preempts state law (including statutory rules) that erect obstacles to the FAA’s objective of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms, and result in special treatment of contracts with arbitration provisions; (2) arbitration provisions must still satisfy common law rules that govern contract formation and enforceability.  As to the second point, we posted on March 29, 2012, about a case in which an automobile dealership’s effort to enforce an arbitration provision was defeated on state-law waiver grounds.  Lewis v. Fletcher Jones Motor Cars, Inc., No. G045603 (4^th Dist. Div. 3 March 26, 2012) (Aronson, J.) (not for publication).

Arbitration/Waiver/Burden of Proof: Substantial Evidence Supported Waiver of FINRA Arbitration

 

St. Agnes Factors Weighted In Favor of Finding of a Waiver

     The leading California case for determining whether a waiver of the right to arbitrate has occurred is St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California, 31 Cal.4^th 1187 (2003). St. Agnes provides a multi-factor test that the court handily applied in Alspaugh v. Dunham, Case No. D09673 (4^th Dist. Div. 1 June 14, 2012) (McDonald, J.) (author) (not for publication).

     In Alspaugh, Plaintiffs sued Defendants claiming investment fraud. Defendants moved to compel arbitration, losing that motion in the trial court. Defendants appealed the denial, claiming the trial court erred by finding they were not required to arbitrate pursuant to the written agreements, and that they had waived any rights to enforce arbitration.

     What were the critical facts resulting in a finding of waiver? Plaintiffs filed their case in February, 2009. Defendants did not file their motion to compel arbitration and stay litigation until March 23, 2011, and their actions were inconsistent with arbitration. Defendants filed multiple substitutions of attorney, bankruptcy filings, requests to continue trial, counter claims, multiple demurrers, took 40 depositions, and propounded thousands of discovery requests.

     True, St. Agnes states that “the party seeking to establish a waiver bears a heavy burden of proof.” 31 Cal.4^th at 1195. But a finding of waiver will usually be fact-based. Therefore, the standard of review will be whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding of waiver.

     Here, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order based on the trial court’s finding of waiver. Therefore, the court did not need to address the merits of alternative grounds for the order denying defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.

Arbitration/Fees/Waiver/Severability/Standard of Review : In Elder Abuse Case, Court of Appeal Affirms Severance From Arbitration Clause of Waiver of Plaintiff’s Statutory Right to Recover Attorney’s Fees

 

Fifth District Explains That By Submitting A Dispute to An Arbitral Forum, A Party Does Not Necessarily Forgo Substantive Statutory Rights

     Plaintiff Ruth Chappell (replaced by her trustee Bickel after she died) sued an assisted living facility, Sunrise Assisted Living, for Elder Abuse. Chappell’s written agreement with Sunrise included an arbitration clause specifying each party would bear its own fees and costs in arbitration. Sunrise petitioned to compel arbitration. The trial court granted the petition, but severed the provision that provided each side was to bear its own fees and costs. That provision amounted to a waiver of plaintiff’s statutory right to recover attorney’s fees if she prevailed on her Elder Abuse claim – a waiver the trial court found to be against public policy. After plaintiff prevailed in the arbitration and was awarded very substantial attorney’s fees ($666,725.30) and costs ($94,694.70), Sunrise appealed the trial court’s decision severing the attorney’s fees and cost provision. Bickel v. Sunrise Assisted Living, Case No. F062443 (5^th Dist. May 21, 2012) (Kane, J., author) (certified for publication).

     “Any one may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement.” Cal. Civ. Code section 3513. Because the court determines whether the statute in question is for a public or a private benefit, the issue is reviewed here de novo.

     Here, the Court of Appeal concluded that the fee shifting provision of the Elder Abuse Act is for a “public benefit”: “the heightened remedies enacted in section 15657 were remedial measures designed to correct a significant problem affecting a highly vulnerable segment of our society.” Accordingly, the statutory rights were created for a public purpose and therefore not waivable by a private agreement. Because the arbitration agreement was not generally permeated by unconscionability, the trial court correctly ordered arbitration, while severing the objectionable waiver of statutory rights intended to be for a public benefit. Judgment affirmed.

     COMMENT:  On March 27, 2012, we blogged that, in a nursing home case, the United States Supreme Court slammed the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, for “misreading and disregarding the precedents of this Court” interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act, and for failing to follow controlling federal law. Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. ____ (2012). The West Virginia court had "concluded that the FAA does not pre-empt the state public policy against predispute arbitration agreements that apply to claims of personal injury or wrongful death against nursing homes." While the United States Supreme Court’s application of the FAA may have shut the door to the courthouse, the approach taken in Bickel shows that it may still be possible to implement an agreement to arbitrate, while preserving unwaivable statutory rights with a little help from the doctrine of severability.

Arbitration/Nonsignatories/Enforcement: Second District, Division 7 Affirms Decision That Plaintiff Was Not Bound By Arbitration Provision In “Close Case”

 

Outcome Depended On Capacity In Which Signatory Signed

     The trial court determined that Plaintiff Allen Othman was not a party to a contract containing an arbitration provision in an agreement, and therefore was not bound to arbitrate his claims against Zions First National Bank. Mr. Othman had tried to purchase a property through a “short sale”, but Zions, the secured lender, ended up instead foreclosing on the property before Mr. Othman’s escrow closed. As a result, the property was sold to a third party. In fact, Mr. Othman had signed a confidentiality agreement with Zions providing for arbitration of all disputes, as “Buyer.” But the first paragraph of the agreement stated that it was between USS Cal Builders Inc. and Zions.  Mr. Othman was a VP of USS Cal Builders Inc.  No wonder the trial court said this “was a close case.” Othman v. Zions First National Bank, Case No. B229825 (2^nd Dist. Div. 7 May 8, 2012) (Jackson, J., author) (unpublished). Zions appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration.

     Perhaps the determining piece of evidence was Mr. Othman’s declaration he had signed the agreement solely on behalf of the corporation, despite his characterization of himself on the signature page as the potential buyer. That was “substantial evidence” enough in this murky situation to support the trial court’s finding on appeal.

      We note that Mr. Othman did not sue on the agreement containing the arbitration provision.  If he had done so, the result would have been different.

     Moral: signature blocks, and the capacity in which a person signs, can make a difference, when it comes to enforcing an arbitration provision.

Arbitration/Standard of Review: Trial Court Properly Vacated Arbitraiton Award, In Light of Unfair Procedure and Lack of Actual Notice

 

Fundamental Fairness Issue Involving Lack of Notice Resulted in De Novo Standard of Review

     Plaintiff and Respondent Roland Hansalik signed a promissory note with Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, with a provision calling for arbitration before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Then Mr. Hansalik moved to Switzerland. Wells Fargo initiated arbitration through FINRA, and obtained an award by default, because Mr. Hansalik never appeared. When enforcement procedures commenced in Switzerland against Mr. Hansalik, he immediately filed a petition in California to vacate the arbitration award, claiming he never received notice. Repeated notices had been sent to the wrong address. The trial court granted his petition, and a timely appeal followed. Hansalik v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, Case No. B232151 (2nd Dist. Div. 2 April 25, 2012) (Ashmann-Gerst, J., author) (unpublished).

     The interesting wrinkle here is that FINRA rules provide in part: "The panel has the authority to interpret and determine the applicability of all provisions under the [FINRA rules]. Such interpretations are final and binding upon the parties." Wells Fargo contended that the arbitrator had the power to interpret the notice rule to determine if service was proper, and that it did so. End of story. Not quite.

     The Court of Appeal had a very different view of the matter, for it characterized Wells Fargo's position thusly:

     "What Wells Fargo is truly advocating is this: If the arbitrator has the contractual authority to determine the sufficiency of notice to a party, then the arbitrator's finding of adequate notice cannot be overturned even if the arbitration was unfair and a party was denied notice and an opportunity to be heard." (italics in the original).

     The Court of Appeal viewed this as a question of fairness and lack of notice, presenting a mixed question of fact and law. Such an issue is reviewed under a "de novo" standard. The Court of Appeal concluded: "Based on the unique facts of this case, FINRA's procedure was unfair." The trial court's order was affirmed.

Arbitration/Standard of Review: Fourth District, Division Two Holds Arbitrator Did Not Exceed Authority In Ruling County Employee Was Terminated Without Just Cause

 

Court of Appeal Also Rejects Public Policy Argument Put Forward By County for Vacating Arbitrator’s Award

     The County of Riverside terminated the Respondent, Ms. Matheson, a network administrator, for allegedly accessing email of the District Attorney’s Office without authorization. Pursuant to the procedure agreed to between the County and Ms. Matheson’s labor union, Ms. Matheson appealed the decision to a neutral arbitrator, presumably Mr. Tamoush, the Defendant. The arbitrator began his discussion by noting that “[m]anagement responded with a solidly emotion reaction to the fact that it never knew, nor chose to understand, why Ms. Matheson would access other Managers’ e[-]mails strictly for procedural reasons.” The arbitrator ordered the County to reinstate Ms. Matheson, and the County appealed, arguing the arbitrator improperly substituted his own judgment for that of the district attorney. County of Riverside v. Tamoush [Defendant] and Matheson [Real Party in Interest], No. E053005 (Fourth Dist. Div. 2 April 10, 2012) (not to be published).

     This is essentially a “standard of review” case. The Court of Appeal points out that it reviews the trial court’s order de novo; thus, it is in essence reviewing the arbitrator’s decision directly and on “extremely narrow” grounds. Arbitrators, “unless specifically required to act in conformity with rules of law, may base their decision upon broad principles of justice and equity . . . . “ “[J]udicial deference to the arbitrator extends to the arbitrator’s choice of remedies.” “In close cases the arbitrator’s decision must stand.” Generally, “it is within the ‘powers’ of the arbitrator to resolve the entire ‘merits’ of the ‘controversy submitted’ by the parties.” Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal.4^th 1, 28 (1992).

     Here, the Court of Appeal concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority. However, like most cases that make it to the Court of Appeal, this one had its wrinkles. The arbitrator here was constrained by a Memorandum of Understanding providing he would not substitute his “discretion or judgment for that of management for sustained charges unless the neutral finds that discrimination, unfairness, capriciousness, or arbitrary action by the County is proven.” But the arbitrator did explicitly find that management action was “capricious and arbitrary”, and according to the Court of Appeal, nothing about the arbitrator’s use of the phrase “appears superficial, fleeting, or ambiguous.”

     The other wrinkle is that the County made a public policy argument for overturning the arbitrator’s award. An arbitrator’s award can be vacated on public policy grounds “in those rare cases where ‘according finality to the arbitrator’s decision would be incompatible with the protection of a statutory right’ or where the award contravenes ‘an explicit legislative expression of public policy’”.  City of Palo Alto v. Service Employees Internat. Union, 77 Cal.App.4^th 327, 334 (1999). The County argued that reinstating Ms. Matheson threatened the district attorney’s duty to enforce the law and protect confidential and privileged communications. But the Court of Appeal wasn’t buying it. The record failed to show “that reinstatement of Matheson would endanger the district attorney’s ability to comply with the cited rule.”

     Disposition: Judgment affirmed. The 3-0 opinion was authored by Justice King.