As Arbitration Clauses Proliferate, So Too Do Motions Concerning Enforcement Of Those Clauses.
I have not done a statistical study, but it is certainly my perception that in recent years there is more and more law and motion practice concerning the enforceability of arbitration clauses in California courts. First, the clauses have proliferated in contracts. Second, litigators and their clients seem attuned to the fact that it can matter greatly whether the case is tried to a judge, a jury, or an arbitrator.
Here are some recent examples in support of the proposition:
Trial court denied employer's petition to compel arbitration. Reversed and remanded. "While the arbitration provision is one-sided, as it excludes any claims arising from the confidentiality agreement . . . we conclude that offending exception is readily severable and, on this record, should have been severed."
Trial court's order denying Defendants Bank of America and The Bank of New York Mellon's motion to compel arbitration is affirmed. The Banks waived the right to arbitrate by unreasonably and prejudicially delaying the arbitration. The waiver issue was not clearly delegated by the rules of the AAA to be decided by the arbitrator.
Trial court's order denying plaintiff Karel's motion to compel arbitration is affirmed. Substantial evidence supported trial court's finding of waiver. Substantial evidence supported findings of express waiver, implied waiver, including delay and prejudice.
Trial court's order denying employer's petition to compel arbitration is reversed. Trial court ruled employer had not established existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Court of Appeal disagreed: "Williams accepted Alorica's arbitration policy offer by continuing to work past a stated deadline."
Trial court's order denying the motion by the employer and similarly aligned employees is reversed as to the employer, and affirmed as to the individual employees. The arbitration agreement between Mohsenin and his employer was not substantively unconscionable: the arbitration agreement was mutual, the fee provision was not substantively unconscionable, and the exclusion of equitable injunctive relief was permissible. Therefore, the employer could compel arbitration. However, the individual employee-appellants who had been sued by Mohsenin were another matter entirely, because they were not third-party beneficiaries of the arbitration agreement. So the employees aligned with the employer could not compel arbitration. .